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ELIMINATING THE COMPETENCY
PRESUMPTION IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY CASES
David R. Katner*
The legal presumption used in virtually all juvenile delinquency
cases in the U.S. is that all juveniles are competent to stand trial.  This
Article calls for the elimination of that legal presumption, which is his-
torically based on the Dusky v. United States decision and in the adult
criminal justice system.  The recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
recognize the developmental and organic brain differences between
adults and juveniles.  Current research demonstrates a higher frequency
rate of incompetence based on intellectual deficiencies among children
when compared with adults found to be not legally competent to stand
trial.  By eliminating the competency presumption for juveniles in both
delinquency and adult criminal proceedings, the party seeking an adjudi-
cation would be responsible for establishing that the accused juvenile is
in fact, competent to stand trial.  Foreign jurisdictions in Europe, Asia,
Africa, and South America have long required higher thresholds—at
least fourteen years of age—for holding juveniles accountable for crimi-
nal misconduct, none of them presuming that juveniles are competent to
go to trial.  In the alternative, by expanding the factors currently in use
for determination of juvenile competency by adding developmental im-
maturity and mental illness, juvenile justice systems could identify the
reduction of recidivist offending as the primary systemic objective.
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INTRODUCTION
As the nation’s juvenile court system evolved since its introduction
in 1899 in Chicago,1 some substantive and procedural rules have been
drafted specifically for this system, whereas other rules—such as the le-
gal presumption of competency—have been extrapolated from the adult
criminal justice system.2  This Article suggests that the legal presumption
that all juveniles are competent to stand trial once they are charged is
fundamentally flawed, and should be modified or eliminated altogether.
Although the legal system inconsistently recognizes the legal rights and
responsibilities of juveniles,3 there should be a consistent application of
the underlying theory, which justifies the continued use of a separate
court of limited jurisdiction for juveniles in delinquency matters.4  By
examining the flaws of the legal presumption of competency of
juveniles, this Article encourages states to modify or eliminate their stat-
utory competency rules based upon current understanding of the devel-
opmental stage of adolescence and adolescent behaviors, and to identify
the most effective approaches to reduce or eliminate recidivist behav-
iors.5  By eliminating the legal presumption of competency, which
originated in the adult criminal justice system, the juvenile system can
re-establish as its main systemic goal the reduction of juvenile recidi-
vism.6  This Piece will examine current legal presumptions of compe-
tency in adult and juvenile proceedings, then it will examine the recent
arguments challenging the competency paradigm, and it will then con-
1 See generally 1899 Ill. Laws 131–37.
2 See generally Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: A Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
3 See Paula Donnolo & Kim K. Azzarelli, Ignoring the Human Rights of Children: A
Perspective on America’s Failure to Ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 203, 203–07 (1996) (stating that despite 191 countries ratifying the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the U.S. ranks among only two nations refusing to
ratify the Convention).
4 See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Con-
sistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275,
346 (2006).
5 See, e.g., Linda L. Dahlberg & Thomas R. Simon, Predicting and Preventing Youth
Violence, in PREVENTING VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE BASED INTERVENTION STRATE-
GIES, 97, 97–98 (J.R. Lutzker ed., 2006).
6 See generally Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Be-
trayal of Childhood in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177 (1966) (discussing international
juvenile justice and restorative measures as well as the need for restructuring current U.S.
practices).
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clude with a proposal for adopting new competency provisions in delin-
quency cases.7
Scholars have found that “Just as the issue of juvenile competence
was neglected by the legal community until a decade ago, psychologists
devoted little attention to the study of juveniles’ psycholegal capacities
until recently.”8  The attention, which social scientists have given to the
capacities of juveniles to meaningfully engage in the juvenile justice sys-
tem, is a major factor that compels the re-examination of the legal pre-
sumption of competency in delinquency proceedings.9  The vast majority
of delinquency cases are brought in state courts rather than in federal
courts.  Each state delinquency system either tacitly assumes or expressly
presumes that juveniles brought into court are legally competent to stand
trial.10
This legal competence presumption has been carried over from the
adult criminal system and has gone relatively unchallenged since the cre-
ation of independent juvenile courts.11  Courts have followed the lan-
guage of Blackstone explaining the application of the competency
principle in adult criminal trials, indicating that:
[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own
acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not
even for treason itself.  Also, if a man in his sound mem-
ory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment
for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for
7 In general:
[A] competent defendant must have capacities to understand information and partici-
pate in the justice system process.  These include the capacities to acquire and use
information about the nature of the charges, trial process, and potential outcomes;
appreciate the significance of this information for one’s own situation; and commu-
nicate with and assist counsel in one’s own defense, including participation in the
trial process and decision making about relevant trial issues.  Included in the ques-
tion about juveniles’ capacity is the issue of whether mental illness and mental retar-
dation, the clinical factors responsible for most adult impairments operate similarly
for adolescents.
Jennifer L. Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles’ Capacities as Defendants,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 173, 177 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
8 Randy K. Otto & Alan M. Goldstein, Juveniles’ Competence to Confess and Compe-
tence to Participate in the Juvenile Justice Process, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION,
ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION, 179, 199 (Kirk Heilbrun et al. eds., 2005) (citation omitted).
9 Kellie M. Johnson, Juvenile Competency Statutes: A Model for State Legislation, 81
IND. L.J. 1067, 1069–70 (2006).
10 Darla M.R. Burnett et al., Adjudicative Competency in a Juvenile Population, 31
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 438, 439 (2004).
11 The one exception to this is that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held several
years ago that due to the rehabilitative nature of juvenile court proceedings, competency is not
required of juvenile defendants. See G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App.
1989).
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it: because he is not able to plead to it with that advice
and caution that he ought.  And if, after he has pleaded,
the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how
can he make his defence?  If, after he be tried and found
guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment
shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he be-
comes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed:
for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law,
had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have
alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.12
Why would we ever challenge the notion that children might not possess
the same capacities as their adult counterparts13 when they engage in acts
of misconduct?14  Psychologists tell us that:
Since modern views of mental illness began to emerge in
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the study of psy-
chopathology in children has lagged behind that of
adults.  For example, in 1812, Benjamin Rush, the first
American psychiatrist, suggested that children were less
likely to suffer from mental illness than adults because
the immaturity of their developing brains would prevent
them from retaining the mental events that caused in-
sanity.  However, it is now well established that many
childhood disorders are common, early-occurring, and
chronic, and that they exact a high toll from children,
their families and society.15
Surely any parent knows better and well understands the myriad differ-
ences between adult decision-making and adolescent decision-making.16
Yet, in the evolution of the juvenile court system, many of the same legal
presumptions that govern adult matters have been matter-of-factly ap-
plied to juvenile matters.17  Otto and Goldstein explain that:
12 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406–07 (1986) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *24–25) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Miller v. Alabama that: “[o]ur history is replete
with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.”
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
14 See Thomas Grisso, Dealing With Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: What We
Need to Know, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 371, 373 (1999).
15 Elizabeth P. Hayden & Eric J. Mash, Child Psychopathology: A Developmental-Sys-
tems Perspective, in CHILD PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 3, 3 (Eric J. Mash & Russell Barkley eds., 3rd
ed. 2014) (citations omitted).
16 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1622 (1992).
17 Not surprisingly, many aspects of the study of child psychopathy have been extrapo-
lated from earlier studies exclusively involving adults.  Until fairly recently much of the fields’
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The physical, cognitive, social, and emotional capacities
of children and adolescents are continually evolving.  It
is this constant and ongoing change, as well as differ-
ences in capacities, that differentiate adolescents from
adults.  Too frequently, judgments about adolescents’
maturation are based on their age or physical develop-
ment and characteristics or the nature and severity of the
delinquent acts they are accused of committing.  These
factors, however, are not reliable indicators of the capac-
ities that are most relevant to understanding their
behavior.18
Modern day forensic clinical psychology “can trace its roots to the juve-
nile courts and the juvenile justice system, as it was in that venue that
psychologists first came to regularly assist judges and attorneys in their
decision making.”19  Surprisingly, while the juvenile justice system has
played a major role in expanding the professional disciplines, which ad-
dress juvenile misconduct and delinquent behaviors, much of the system
continues to be based on legal processes and assumptions that, while
appropriate for adult matters, are incompatible with juvenile capacities
and behaviors.20
While it is true that the sentencing options in juvenile systems vary
widely from adult systems,21 the legal presumptions in these two systems
are often tantamount, if not identical.22  It may be that the juvenile sys-
tem created so many challenges, that attention was given to what ap-
peared to be the most pressing concerns, such as funding, defining
intervention services, and determining what processes would apply in
juvenile courts.23  The notion that juveniles might not have the same de-
accumulated knowledge about the phenomenology of disorders of childhood was extrapolated
from work with adults.  For example, only in recent decades have child-focused models of
depressive disorders emerged. See Hayden & Mash, supra note 15, at 4; see also HANDBOOK R
OF DEPRESSION IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (John R. Z. Abela & Benjamin L. Hankin
eds., 2008).
18 Otto & Goldstein, supra note 8, at 180–81 (citations omitted). R
19 Id. at 179.
20 As Justice Sotomayor indicated in her opinion in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, “officers
and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in
cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age.
They simply need the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither
is an adult.”  131 S. Ct. 2394, 2407 (2011).
21 See Brandi Miles Moore, Blended Sentencing for Juveniles: The Creation of a Third
Criminal Justice System?, 22 J. JUV. L. 126, 130–31 (2001).
22 This result occurs despite the Supreme Court’s recognition in Miller v. Alabama that
“We have by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may
not be so for children.”  132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
23 “More broadly, police arrest nearly 2 million juveniles each year, and demographers
predict that one in three American schoolchildren will be arrested by the age of twenty-three.
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cisional capacities as adults,24 or that their comprehension skills might
not be equivalent with their adult counterparts25 may simply not have
been on anyone’s radar as this unique court system developed.26  Elimi-
nating or modifying the legal presumption of competence is but one step
in the identification of and reassertion of the main objective of the juve-
nile delinquency system, the reduction or elimination of recidivist
offending.27
I. CURRENT LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS OF COMPETENCE IN ADULT
AND JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
The modern legal concept of competency to stand trial is based
upon three main contributing sources: 1) individual state statutes gov-
erning adult criminal and/or juvenile procedures; 2) state court decisions
at both the trial and appellate levels; and 3) federal court decisions, in-
cluding a select number of cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court.28  Much of the current literature focuses solely upon Supreme
Court decisions, and not infrequently only upon the holdings of such
cases with little regard for facts or background that gave rise to the legal
dispute that eventually brought the case into the federal court system.  It
is helpful to have a better understanding and background of these cases
so frequently referenced in discussions about legal competency.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the legal issue of a
defendant’s competency to stand trial not in a case involving a juvenile
but in a case involving an adult criminal defendant.  The 1960 landmark
All this is so despite the fact that juvenile crime is steadily declining.” NELL BERNSTEIN,
BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF JUVENILE PRISON 7 (2014).
24 See Carrie S. Fried & N. Dickon Reppucci, Criminal Decision Making: The Develop-
ment of Adolescent Judgment, Criminal Responsibility, and Culpability, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 45, 46 (2001).
25 See Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings—Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 656 (1995).
26 The unanticipated high frequency of psychiatric illnesses in juveniles in detention fa-
cilities is one such challenge. See Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in
Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1137 (2002).
27 See Erika K. Penner et al., Procedural Justice Versus Risk Factors for Offending,
Predicting Recidivism in Youth, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 225, 225 (2014) (explaining that by
treating juveniles in a fair and just manner, justice professionals may be able to reduce the
likelihood that adolescents will reoffend).
28 Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution established the Supreme Court
as the focal point of all judicial power:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during
good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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decision, Dusky v. United States, was a per curiam opinion that was
barely half a page in length.29  The Court rejected a federal district
court’s determination that first found the defendant was competent, and
subsequently convicted him of unlawfully transporting in interstate com-
merce a girl who had been kidnapped.  The Supreme Court concluded
that the record below was simply insufficient to support a finding that the
defendant had been competent to stand trial under the federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 4244.30  The Court wrote that:
[I]t [is] not enough for the trial court to find that “the
defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some
recollection of events,” but that the “test must be
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing—and whether he has a rational as well as fac-
tual understanding of the proceedings against him.”31
There was no lengthy or detailed discussion about legal competency, no
legal analysis of the history of the legal concept, just an assertion that the
record below was not sufficient to conclude that the accused was in fact
competent at the time of the trial.  This case of first impression focused
on adult competency, and so, the application of legal rights of adoles-
cents in separate juvenile delinquency proceedings remained unaddressed
29 362 U.S. 402 (1960). The opinion in its entirety is as follows:
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of
certiorari are granted.  Upon consideration of the entire record we agree with the
Solicitor General that “the record in this case does not sufficiently support the find-
ings of competency to stand trial,” for to support those findings under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4244, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 the district judge “would need more information than this
record presents.”  We also agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that it is
not enough for the district judge to find that “the defendant [is] oriented to time and
place and [has] some recollection of events,” but that the “test must be whether he
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him.”
In view of the doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance of the
psychiatric testimony in this case and the resulting difficulties of retrospectively de-
termining the petitioner’s competency as of more than a year ago, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction, and remand
the case to the District Court for a new hearing to ascertain petitioner’s present
competency to stand trial, and for a new trial if petitioner is found competent.  It is
so ordered.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Id. at 402–03.
30 Id. at 402.
31 Id.  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case with directions because of the
“ambiguities regarding the legal significance of the psychiatric testimony in [the] case and the
resulting difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner’s competency as of more
than a year ago.” Id. at 403.
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for the next seven years.32  Assuming that the requirements announced in
Dusky for adult competency to stand trial were appropriate at the time of
the decision in 1960, there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court
had anticipated such legal standards would also be applied to juveniles as
young as ten years old, let alone that any such legal standards would be
appropriate for measuring juvenile competency to stand trial.
The state of mental health treatment and the mental health profes-
sion was far different in 1960 than it is today,33 yet the present day legal
concept of competency remains firmly rooted in this per curiam decision
that simply remanded the Dusky case back to the lower court without
discussion.  By 1960, frontal lobotomies had been performed on tens of
thousands of mental patients,34 and one physician was awarded a Nobel
Prize for doing so.35  Many of these operations were performed by physi-
cians with little or no surgical training, and there was no widespread
consensus among physicians about the effectiveness of the procedures.36
32 Nevertheless, state legislatures started enacting statutory provisions using Dusky de-
fining competency and addressing legal procedures to challenge it and the protocol to be fol-
lowed should the accused be found not to be competent. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
502(a)(1) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3318 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2401
(2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410(A) (Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-9 (Lexis-
Nexis 2008); State v. J.S., No. 0312013339, 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 75, at *10–15 (Aug. 2,
2005), rev’d, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. 2007); In re T.D.W., 441 N.E.2d 155, 156–57 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982), overruled by People v. Gentry, 815 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re K.G., 808
N.E.2d 631, 637–38 (Ind. 2004); In re A.B., No. 5-791/05-0868, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 189,
at *7–9 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2006); In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d 742, 746–47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000);
In re Two Minor Children, 592 P.2d 166, 169 (Nev. 1979); In re Johnson, No. 7998, 1983
Ohio App. LEXIS 14017, at *12–14 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1983); State v. E.C., 922 P.2d 152,
155–56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
33 These observations are of course applicable to the legal system of the 1960s as well,
which tolerated much that today would seem surprising, if not shocking. See generally Franz
G. Alexander & Sheldon T. Selesnick, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: AN EVALUATION OF
PSYCHIATRIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE FROM PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE PRESENT 269–401
(1966) (describing various psychiatric treatment used in the 1960s).
34 See ELLIOTT S. VALENSTEIN, GREAT AND DESPERATE CURES: THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF PSYCHOSURGERY AND OTHER RADICAL TREATMENTS FOR MENTAL ILLNESS 228 (1986)
(describing the history of lobotomy).
35 In 1949, the inventor of the frontal lobotomy—Anto´nio Caetano de Abreu Freire Egas
Moniz, known in psychiatry only as Egas Moniz, a nom de guerre, and the head of neurology
at University of Lisbon—was awarded the Nobel Prize.  Marshall J. Getz, The Ice Pick of
Oblivion: Moniz, Freeman and the Development of Psychosurgery, 13 TRAMES 129, 135,
138–39 (2009).  Lobotomy, also referred to as “leucotomy,” and other forms of psychosurgery
are still used today despite documented terrible results, albeit not nearly as frequently as in the
1950s and 1960s. See Jacqueline Klein, A Theory of Punishment: The Use of Mechanical
Restraints in Psychiatric Care, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 47, 62–63 (2011).  The
lobotomized patient, following surgery, “‘was confused and apathetic, blood pressure dropped,
and body weight increased at a striking rate . . . gave monosyllabic responses to questions in a
flat tone; had a blank expression; lost control over bowel and bladder; had to be fed like an
infant.’” Id. at 62 (quoting LELAND V. BELL, TREATING THE MENTALLY ILL: FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 145 (1980)).
36 See VALENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 222. R
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In the wake of the Kennedy family’s decision to have their daughter,
Rosemary, lobotomized in 1941, and the very poor reaction to that proce-
dure resulting in her spending the remainder of her life secluded in a
convent in Wisconsin until her death in 2005,37 coupled with the much
publicized involuntary lobotomy of the then rising Hollywood actress,
Frances Farmer,38 public knowledge and resistance to the growing utili-
zation of “psychosurgery”39 as it was then called, began slowly to de-
velop.40  The procedures employed for the treatment of patients with
mental problems in 1960 were significantly different than practices uti-
lized today.
By 1952, a French pharmaceutical company had refined phenothia-
zine to chlorpromazine (or “thorazine”) to control the psychotic symp-
toms in patients, and this would forever change the face of psychiatry.41
Nevertheless, also by 1952, the team of Walter Freeman and James Win-
ston Watts—who had been performing lobotomies using an icepick since
194742—had performed over 600 lobotomies,43 while about 5,000 such
operations throughout the country were being done annually.44  Current
estimates suggest that as many as 40,000 Americans were “psychosur-
gery” patients during the decades-long period45 this surgery was being
performed.46
Long term hospitalizations were commonplace for those with suffi-
cient funds or insurance, and the American Psychiatric Association was
still using the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, first published in 1952, but still in use in 1960 when
Dusky was decided.47  The diagnosis of homosexuality in 1960 was con-
37 Martin Weil, Rosemary Kennedy, 86; President’s Disabled Sister, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
2005, at B06.
38 See generally FRANCES FARMER, WILL THERE REALLY BE A MORNING? AN AUTOBI-
OGRAPHY (1972).
39 WALTER FREEMAN & JAMES W. WATTS, PSYCHOSURGERY IN THE TREATMENT OF
MENTAL DISORDERS AND INTRACTABLE PAIN, at xx–xxiii (2d ed. 1950).
40 See Getz, supra note 35, at 146; Gretchen J. Diefenbach et al., Portrayal of Lobotomy R
in the Popular Press: 1935–1960, 8 J. HIST. NEUROSCIENCES 60, 66 (1999).
41 See generally Thomas A. Ban, Fifty Years Chlorpromazine: A Historical Perspective,
3 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 495 (2007) (detailing the creation of Chlor-
promazine at Laboratoires Rhoˆne-Poulenc).
42 Mical Raz, The Painless Brain: Lobotomy, Psychiatry, and the Treatment of Chronic
Pain and Terminal Illness, 52 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 555, 556 (2009).
43 But by 1956, Watts and his team were reviewing cases of over 3,000 lobotomies they
had performed. See Walter Freeman, Frontal Lobotomy, 1936–1956: A Follow-Up Study of
3000 Patients from One to Twenty Years, 113 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 877, 877–78 (1957); Walter
Freeman, Psychosurgery, 106 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 534 (1950).
44 Getz, supra note 35, at 146. R
45 Id. at 147.
46 Id.
47 As of this publication, the DSM-V, or 5th edition is the current authoritative version,
or “the bible of psychiatry.” See MAKING THE DSM-5, CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES, at v
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sidered a “mental illness.”48  In the 1960s, American psychiatry was pri-
marily focused on psychoanalysis, and its legitimacy in medicine was
seriously called into question.49  This is not meant to be a general criti-
cism of mental health services as they existed in 1960.  Rather, the clas-
sifications of mental illness, the experimental surgical procedures
utilized, and the reliance on analysis primarily rather than medication-
based treatments was considered the state of the art for that era.
Today, many of these procedures and classifications would be
viewed with a great deal of skepticism—and perhaps with some degree
of shock—but this was a discipline in transition as the rise of administer-
ing medication and psychopharmacology was essentially in its infancy.
There are more than a few legal cases and laws that existed during the
same era, which, if viewed through the lens of our current legal under-
standing, would create more than a little controversy.  The point being
that behavioral science has made great strides over the past fifty years,
and that the methods of psychiatric and psychological assessment of pa-
tients have come a long way.  The limited factors that governed mental
health evaluations fifty years ago would be dated and in some instances
inappropriate by today’s measure.50  Given the substantial progress made
over the past fifty years in mental health treatments and understanding,51
surely the legal system should not be bound to a stagnant definition of
legal competency or to antiquated policies affecting offenders with
mental health issues or developmental immaturity.52
In 1966, the Supreme Court once again addressed the competency
to stand trial issue, in Pate v. Robinson, where the Court declared that the
failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not
to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprived the
accused of his due process right to a fair trial.53  The Due Process Clause
(Joel Paris & James Phillips eds., 2013).  The DSM-I was in use from 1952 until 1968 when
the American Psychiatric Association published the DSM-II.  Id. at 6–7.
48 See Andreas DeBlock & Pieter R. Adriaens, Pathologizing Sexual Deviance: A His-
tory, 50 J. SEX RES. 276, 280–82 (2013) (describing how both American and European psychi-
atrists have categorized sexual behaviors over the past 150 years); Owen Whooley & Allan V.
Horwitz, The Paradox of Professional Success: Grand Ambition, Furious Resistance, and the
Derailment of the DSM-5 Revision Process, in MAKING THE DSM-5, CONCEPTS AND CONTRO-
VERSIES 75, 78 (Joel Paris & James Phillips eds., 2013).
49 Id.
50 See Mark R. Fondacaro & L.G. Fasig, Judging Juvenile Responsibility: A Social Eco-
logical Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 355, 369 (Nancy
E. Dowd et al. eds., 2006).
51 See Mical Raz, Between the Ego and the Icepick: Psychosurgery, Psychoanalysis, and
Psychiatric Discourse, 82 BULL. HIST. MED. 387, 415–20 (2008).
52 See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness:
Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 111 (2011).
53 383 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1966).
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of the 14th Amendment had become the focal point of the Court’s legal
inquiry where competence had been challenged.
The course of juvenile justice in this country was changed forever
seven years after Dusky, when the United States Supreme Court forged
its 1967 landmark decision in In re Gault.54  Fifteen-year-old Gerald
Gault had been charged with using lewd and indecent language in a
phone call to a neighbor in Arizona.  Gerald Gault was arrested, de-
tained, and tried without notice of the charges against him, without a
lawyer, and without any testimony from either the accuser or from any of
his own defense witnesses.  He was sentenced to the Fort Grant Reform
School until his 21st birthday, or a six-year sentence for his offense.55  In
an eight-to-one decision, the United States Supreme Court held that chil-
dren charged in juvenile court were entitled to the assistance of legal
counsel, to confront and cross-examine their accusers, and to the protec-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination.56  Thus, juvenile courts
and their legal procedures were radically changed, and much of the west-
ern world took note.  Nevertheless, it was the language of the lower state
court’s decision in Gault by Justice Charles C. Bernstein—writing for
the Arizona Supreme Court—that best explains to this day the raison
d’eˆtre of the modern American juvenile court:
[J]uvenile courts do not exist to punish children for their
transgressions against society.  The juvenile court stands
in the position of a protecting parent rather than a prose-
cutor.  It is an effort to substitute protection and gui-
dance for punishment, to withdraw the child from
criminal jurisdiction and use social sciences regarding
the study of human behavior which permit flexibilities
within the procedures.  The aim of the court is to provide
individualized justice for children.  Whatever the formu-
lation, the purpose is to provide authoritative treatment
for those who are no longer responding to the normal
restraints the child should receive at the hands of his par-
ents.  The delinquent is the child of, rather than the en-
emy of society, and their interests coincide.57
54 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
55 See Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A
Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 371 (2008).  Gault actually spent only six months
in the state training school. Id. at 379 n.5.
56 Id. at 371.  Yet, juveniles were not guaranteed a right to bail, the right to trial by jury,
the right to a speedy trial, or the right to represent themselves. Id.
57 In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760, 765, 99 Ariz. 181, 188 (Ariz. 1965), rev’d, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
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In re Gault changed everything in the application of procedures and sub-
stantive law as it related to juveniles, but the decision—which occurred
at the height of the Warren Court’s judicial activism—had been based
also upon the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, not the substantive provisions of the Sixth Amendment.58  Al-
though much earlier court decisions involving the rights of juveniles had
been based upon application of the Due Process Clause,59 Gault ushered
in a radical shift in the legal procedures applied in juvenile delinquency
adjudication hearings (trials).
By 1975, the Supreme Court was again asked to resolve a compe-
tency matter in Drope v. Missouri.60  The defendant, James Edward
Drope, convicted in the St. Louis Circuit Court of the capital offense of
the forcible rape of his wife, was absent during parts of his trial proceed-
ings due to his attempt to kill his wife on the Sunday prior to his trial,
followed by his own attempted suicide by shooting himself on the second
day of the trial.  The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion for mis-
trial, ruling that the defendant’s absence was voluntary, and that the trial
would go forward while the defendant remained hospitalized.  The de-
fendant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.  The Drope
Court unanimously (Chief Justice Burger penned the opinion) declared
that the defendant was denied due process of law because of the failure
of the trial court to order a psychiatric examination of the accused.  The
Supreme Court relied upon the Due Process Clause as the focal point for
the Court’s decision.61
By the mid-2000s, the application of the Court’s recognition of de-
velopmental limitations of adolescents resulted in several separate deci-
sions, Roper v. Simmons,62 Graham v. Florida,63 and Miller v.
Alabama.64  In these three cases, the Supreme Court compared outcomes
with adult offenders charged with similar crimes, but decreed that
58 See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Gault Turns 40: Reflections on Ambiguity, 44 CRIM. L.
BULL. 3 (2008).
59 See, e.g., People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870) (citing to the state’s recently-enacted
constitution’s Due Process Clause where the Illinois Supreme Court released a fourteen-year-
old boy from incarceration in the Chicago Reform School and struck down key provisions in
the state reform school laws).
60 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
61 Id. at 163–64.
62 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute
anyone for a crime committed under the age of eighteen).
63 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that is was unconstitutional to impose a life without
parole—LWOP—sentence on anyone who committed a nonhomicide offense under the age of
eighteen).
64 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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juveniles were less culpable than adults, deserving of less punishment
than adult offenders.65
In Roper, Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion cited scientific
and sociological studies of juvenile brain development as authority for
the ruling that application of the death penalty to juveniles would be
violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.66  The noninvasive techniques developed by neuros-
cientists to study the juvenile brain since the 1990s include magnetic
resonance imagining (MRI) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI),67 which contribute to the conclusion that the adolescent brain—
once thought to be fully developed—actually continues to develop until
the early to mid-twenties.68
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court concluded that life-with-
out-parole sentence for juveniles, like capital punishment, may violate
the Eighth Amendment when imposed on juveniles.69  The Court found
that because “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale” relates to an of-
fender’s blameworthiness, “the case for retribution is not as strong with a
minor as with an adult.”70  Additionally, the deterrent impact is negligi-
ble because “‘the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable
than adults’”—immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make them
less likely to consider potential punishment.71
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held a statutory scheme
that mandates life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for of-
fenders under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense would be
unconstitutional, even for minors who have been convicted of homi-
cide.72  The reduced culpability of juveniles was a defining component of
the Court’s analysis.73 Miller involved two cases in which juvenile de-
fendants received mandatory life sentences for having been convicted of
homicides when they were fourteen years old.  Miller had been raised in
65 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003).
66 543 U.S. at 569–76.
67 See Kent A. Kiehl et al., Temporal Lobe Abnormalities in Semantic Processing by
Criminal Psychopaths As Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 130 PSYCHIA-
TRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 297 (2004).
68 See William J. Katt, Roper and the Scientific Amicus, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 253, 266–67
(2009).
69 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
70 Id. at 71 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); Roper, 543 U.S. at
571).
71 Id. at 72 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571).
72 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
73 See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentenc-
ing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263
(2013).
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foster homes, had been physically abused by his stepfather,74 had parents
who suffered drug addictions, while his mother also suffered from alco-
holism, and the juvenile himself regularly used illegal drugs as well as
alcohol.75  Miller had also attempted suicide on four different occasions,
the first when he should have been in kindergarten.76  Miller was tried as
an adult, was convicted of murder, and was sentenced to mandatory life
without parole.77  The Court ruled that “children are constitutionally dif-
ferent from adults for purposes of sentencing.”78  The Court cited to be-
havioral studies that affirmed notions that minors are less responsible,
more impulsive, and more amenable to rehabilitation than their adult
counterparts.79
One scholar has argued that following the Supreme Court decisions
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,80 and the Roper/Graham/Miller line of
cases, the Court may be developing a constitutional distinction between
minors and adults that applies across a range of contexts, making chil-
dren constitutionally different from adults “for many purposes beyond
criminal sentencing.”81  Nevertheless, critics have argued that some of
the studies cited by the Supreme Court are either insufficient or just out-
dated.82  Other critics have taken issue with the Court’s conclusion that
scientific studies tend to demonstrate that adolescents are not morally
responsible for their misconduct.83  Even though Roper/Graham/Miller
appears to introduce the Supreme Court’s recognition of the diminished
responsibility of adolescent offenders, the cases are limited to prohibiting
the application of the death penalty and life without parole for juvenile
offenders.84  The Court’s utilization of adolescent developmental re-
search85 could easily be applied beyond the limitations of these hold-
74 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
75 Id. at 2462.
76 Id. at 2469.
77 Id. at 2462–63.
78 Id. at 2464.
79 Id.
80 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (The Court found that the age of a suspect was relevant
to whether a suspect was “in custody” for Miranda purposes under the 5th Amendment, and
that a “reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to sub-
mit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”).
81 John F. Stinneford, Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama and the Future of Juvenile Sen-
tencing, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2013).
82 Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 379, 379 (2006).
83 Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diag-
nostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 407 (2006) (arguing that the studies cited in the Roper
decision do not confirm that adolescents are less responsible for their misconduct).
84 See Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to
Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107 (2013); Stinneford, supra note 81, at 7. R
85 See James M. Bjork et al., Developmental Differences in Posterior Mesofrontal Cortex
Recruitment by Risky Rewards, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4839 (2007); Neir Eshel et al., Neural
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ings,86 and considered by state legislators seeking to better respond to
juvenile misconduct.87
One group of researchers has concluded:
Defense attorneys did not begin to raise the question of
competency in juvenile court until the 1990’s.  As new
laws were passed to treat youth more harshly and more
like adult defendants, defense attorneys started raising
competency to protect their clients in juvenile court.
Since no juvenile competency standards existed, either
in case law or statute, attorneys and courts frequently re-
lied on their state’s criminal competency statute as the
standard.  Currently, all states except Oklahoma now
recognize that youth in juvenile court must be competent
to stand trial . . . .88
In addition to the decisions by the Supreme Court, the most important
legal sources for defining juvenile competency include state statutes89
and various court decisions from the lower courts.90  While many states
enacted statutory provisions following the Dusky decision that define
Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescents: Development of the Ventrolateral
Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate Cortices, 45 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICA 1270 (2007), cited in
Brief for Petitioner at 42, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
86 But see Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Devel-
opment Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 34, 37–48 n.144 (2009) (arguing for the reevalua-
tion of “[c]onventional wisdom” that the law should “assign rights and responsibilities” based
upon “assessments of children’s capacities documented in the scientific research” because
such an approach incorrectly assumes that children’s capacities are “ascertainable and fixed”).
87 See Nina W. Chernoff & Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty: Implications
of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense and Sanctioning of Youthful
Offenders, 209 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 213 (2005).
88 NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, MODELS FOR CHANGE POLICY UPDATE: COMPE-
TENCY TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 2
(2012), available at http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/NJJN_MfC_Juvenile-Compe
tency-to-Stand-Trial_FINAL-Nov2012.pdf [hereinafter POLICY UPDATE].
89 See infra Appendix A.
90 Some of the lower court decisions include:
[A] ruling from the Iowa Court of Appeals that immaturity and intellectual capacity
can lead to a finding of incompetency to stand trial, and an opinion from the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals that “competency evaluations should be made in light of juve-
nile, rather than adult, norms.”  Similarly, Ohio appellate courts refer to the adult
statute on competency to stand trial as applying to juvenile court, provided that “ju-
venile norms” are utilized.  These rulings appear to permit a “watering down” of
Dusky standards for defendants in juvenile court.
The eighteen jurisdictions that have a statute or court rule for juvenile court
tend to hold that competency to stand trial requires only an ability to understand the
proceedings and to assist counsel.  For example, Virginia’s statute provides:
If the juvenile is otherwise able to understand the charges against him and
assist in his defense, a finding of incompetency shall not be made based solely
on any or all the following: (i) the juvenile’s age or developmental factors; (ii)
the juvenile’s claim to be unable to remember the time period surrounding the
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competency to stand trial using the exact same language found in the
Court decision, other states have enacted their own language without re-
liance on Dusky as the sole factor for the definition of legal competency.
Some states have adopted specific requirements defining juvenile compe-
tency, while still other states have simply applied the same definition of
competency as applied to adults for juveniles who challenge competency.
A single unified definitional approach to competency may have some
limitations.  In the National Juvenile Justice Network’s overview to the
Models for Change initiative guide Developing Statutes for Competence
to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: A Guide for
Lawmakers, developed through the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation,91 it is noted:
While many adult criminal competency statutes refer to
mental illness and intellectual disability as underlying
factors for incompetence, none refer to a defendant’s de-
velopmental maturity—a critical factor to consider when
evaluating the competency of a youth to stand trial.  The
ongoing process of adolescent development can amplify
mental illness or intellectual disabilities that are already
affecting a youth’s competence.  And developmental im-
maturity alone can raise concerns about a youth’s com-
petence to stand trial. . . .  It would be foolish to neglect
these major components of human development when
making such determinations.92
By examining some of the more recent criticisms of the status quo juve-
nile competency definitions, we can better appreciate why the brief
alleged offense, or (iii) the fact that the juvenile is under the influence of
medication.
The only special consideration for juveniles among these jurisdictions can be
found in four states.  Florida’s and Maryland’s competency laws include a capacity
to appreciate the charges, range of penalties, and adversarial nature of the process; to
disclose pertinent facts to counsel; to display appropriate courtroom behavior; and to
testify relevantly.  Louisiana holds that incompetency to stand trial can stem from
immaturity.  Vermont’s juvenile court rule mentions age and developmental matur-
ity, mental illness, developmental disorders, any other disability, and “any other fac-
tor” that could affect competency in juvenile court.
Most of the law related to competency to stand trial in juvenile court addresses
the mental illness or mental retardation connection to competency (and treatment
prognosis and restoration services) and what should be done with defendants who
are incompetent to stand trial.
Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading Through the Rhetoric
and the Evidence, 99 J.  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 141–42 (2008) (citations omitted).
91 KIMBERLY LARSON ET AL., DEVELOPING STATUTES FOR COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS: A GUIDE FOR LAWMAKERS (2011), http://www.njjn
.org/uploads/digital-library/Developing_Statutes_for_Competence_to_Stand_Trial_in_Juve
nile_Delinquency_Proceedings_A_Guide_for_Lawmakers-MfC-3_1.30.12_1.pdf.
92 POLICY UPDATE, supra note 88, at 4. R
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Dusky decision to simply remand the case for further findings fifty years
ago should not be the sole foundation for defining juvenile competency
to stand trial today.
II. RECENT ARGUMENTS CHALLENGING THE COMPETENCY PARADIGM
Recognizing the ever increasing body of literature focused on the
very high rates of mental disabilities of the children involved in juvenile
and adult criminal systems93—almost 65% of incarcerated juveniles and
60% of detained juveniles meet criteria for one or another DSM-V disor-
der94—the interdisciplinary study initiated by the MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice fo-
cused on the impact of adolescent developmental immaturity and juve-
nile competency to stand trial.95  One conclusion reached by the multi-
year study was considered the “uncomfortable reality” that “[u]nder
well-accepted constitutional restrictions on the state’s authority to adjudi-
cate those charged with crimes, many young offenders—particularly
among those under 14—may not be appropriate participants for criminal
adjudication.”96
Today, neuroscience recognizes that one of the last areas of the ado-
lescent brain to develop is the prefrontal cortex, serving as the center for
“executing cognitive functions” such as planning, organizing informa-
tion, and thinking about possible consequences of one’s actions.97  The
prefrontal cortex also controls the capacity to inhibit or to delay impul-
sive and emotional reactions sufficiently to allow for the rational consid-
eration or appropriate responses, also called “affect regulation.”98
93 Additionally, many believe that the estimated numbers of incarcerated offenders suf-
fering from mental illness are under-representative of actual prevalence rates, and that persons
with mental illness have increased disproportionately over the last ten years leaving the U.S.
with three times more individuals with severe mental illness in prison than in psychiatric hos-
pitals.  Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research Synthesis,
36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (2012).
94 Machteld Hoeve et al., The Influence of Mental Health Disorders on Severity of Reof-
fending in Juveniles, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 289, 289 (2013) (describing a multisite study
involving almost 10,000 youths in a range of juvenile justice settings, compared to only 15%
of youths in the general population with mental health prevalence rates).
95 Thomas Grisso, Laurence Steinberg, Jennifer Woolard, Elizabeth Cauffman, Elizabeth
Scott, Sandra Graham, Fran Lexcen, N. Dickon Reppucci & Robert Schwartz, Juveniles’ Com-
petence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defend-
ants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 333 (2003) [hereinafter MacArthur Study].
96 Id. at 358.
97 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 812–13 (2005).
98 As the Supreme Court noted in Miller v. Alabama:
In Roper, we cited studies showing that “‘[o]nly a relatively small proportion of
adolescents’” who engage in illegal activity “‘develop entrenched patterns of prob-
lem behavior.’” Roper v. Simmons, 570 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (quoting Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmen-
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Current studies and research reveal that juveniles in early to mid-adoles-
cence are generally neurologically immature,99 and their brains are unsta-
ble in comparison to their adult counterparts.100  They tend to act more
impulsively and without any planning in comparison to adults.101  Ado-
lescents appear to be more focused on short-term risks and benefits of
their decision-making and pay far less attention to possible long-term
consequences of their decisions than do adults.102  Of course, these asser-
tions may be accurate for normative juvenile and adult development, but
many of the juveniles in criminal and delinquency systems demonstrate
abnormal developments103 coupled with environmental, familial, peer,
social, and biological influences, which require further empirical studies.
In addition, noted developmental gaps exist between adolescents in
the fourteen and under age range when compared to adolescents in the
sixteen to eighteen year age range.104  Attempting to equate adult compe-
tency issues with adolescent competency issues can be misleading, if not
misapplied.105  For example, in one jurisdictional study, adults with intel-
lectual deficits as measured by IQ results tend to be found not competent
tal Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).  And in Graham, we noted that “developments
in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds”—for example, in “parts of the brain involved in behavior
control.”  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).  We reasoned that those find-
ings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess conse-
quences—both lessened a child’s “moral culpability” and enhanced the prospect
that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his “‘deficiencies will
be reformed.’” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2012).
99 See id. at 2465 n.5: “It is increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not yet fully
mature in regions and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance.” See also Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain
Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 767 (2011) (“Over the last
decade, developmental neuroscience has generated a scientific consensus that, when consid-
ered in the aggregate, teen brains are structurally and functionally different from those of both
children and adults.  As those differences are nonnegligible and as they appear to map onto
teens’ social and decisional immaturity, juvenile advocates and defenders quickly began to
incorporate neuroscientific claims into ones grounded in developmental psychology.”).
100 See M. Davis & P.J. Whalen, The Amygdala: Vigilance and Emotion, 6 MOLECULAR
PSYCHIATRY 13 (2001).
101 Id.
102 See Carrie S. Fried & N.D. Reppucci, Criminal Decision Making: The Development of
Adolescent Judgment, Criminal Responsibility and Culpability, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 45,
46 (2001).
103 See generally Randall T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Transfer to Adult Courts: A Look at
the Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment
Through a Legal Lens, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 373, 373 (2002).
104 For a detailed review of developmental stage-based approaches to juvenile justice re-
form, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL AP-
PROACH (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013).
105 See MacArthur Study, supra note 95 (revealing through a multi-jurisdictional study R
comparing adolescents’ abilities to those of young adults that juveniles are relatively incompe-
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at vastly different rates than adolescents falling within the same lower
range of IQ results.106  Not unlike adults, juveniles may have low IQs,107
learning disabilities, and other neuropsychological impairments108 that
impact competency,109 but current research demonstrates a higher fre-
quency rate of incompetence based on intellectual deficiencies among
children when compared with the rate among adults found to be lacking
legal competence to stand trial.110
In the medical community, studies done on common disorders such
as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) demonstrate that
pharmacological treatment with medications such as methylphenidate,
atomoxetine, and, rarely, amphetamines and dextroamphetamines can re-
duce the risk of criminal behaviors especially in adolescents.111  Roughly
5% of all children in the western world meet the diagnostic criteria for
ADHD,112 and researchers frequently associate this disorder with crimi-
nal misconduct and externalizing disorders.113  Yet, one of the more
compelling problems with pharmacological treatment of adolescents with
this disorder—without any therapy component—is the frequent discon-
tinuation of the regimen of medication.114  Child and adolescent psychol-
ogy researchers continue to develop psychometric instruments designed
to assess predicted recidivism among youthful offenders.115
tent, and addressing developmental immaturity and its impact on a juvenile’s ability to assist
counsel).
106 The data of McGaha and colleagues found that fifty-eight percent of youths were
found incompetent in a Florida sample, compared to six percent of adults with an intellectual
disability diagnosis in the same jurisdiction.  Annette McGaha et al., Juveniles Adjudicated
Incompetent to Proceed: A Descriptive Study of Florida’s Competence Restoration Program,
29 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW 427 (2001).
107 See Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Low-IQ Juveniles, 19 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3 (1998).
108 See Kaitlyn McLachlan et al., Evaluating the Psycholegal Abilities of Young Offenders
with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 10 (2014).
109 See Frances J. Lexcen et al., Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial, 24 CHILD. LEGAL
RTS. J. 2 (2004).
110 See POLICY UPDATE, supra note 88, at 3. R
111 Paul Lichtenstein et al., Medication for Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder and
Criminality, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2006 (2012) (discussing a three year study involving
25,656 patients in Sweden wherein a significant reduction of 32% in the criminality rate for
men and a reduction of 41% for women who remained on their regimen of medication).
112 Guilherme Polanczyk et al., The Worldwide Prevalence of ADHD: A Systematic Re-
view and Metaregression Analysis, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 942, 945 (2007).
113 See James H. Satterfield et al., A 30-year Prospective Follow-Up Study of Hyperactive
Boys with Conduct Problems: Adult Criminality, 46 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHI-
ATRY 601, 601 (2007).
114 See Suzanne McCarthy et al., Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Treatment
Discontinuation in Adolescents and Young Adults, 194 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 273, 273 (2009).
115 See Mark E. Olver et al., Short and Long-Term Prediction of Recidivism Using the
Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory in a Sample of Serious Young Offenders,
36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 331, 331 (2012).
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A growing body of literature examines the effectiveness of diverting
people (mainly adults)116 with serious mental illness117 from the criminal
justice system into mental health treatment programs.118  The time frame
for these diversions (i.e. prebooking and postbooking) may have very
little impact on the outcome119 of the services provided.120  Many states
have developed mental health courts as a form of diversion from the
criminal justice system,121 seeking to enroll the mentally ill into outpa-
tient programs for treatment rather than handling their cases in a more
traditionally adversarial approach.122  There were two such courts in
1997, but by 2008 the number of mental health courts had increased to
approximately 150.123  It is not without some measure of irony, however,
that the patients selected to participate in most mental health court pro-
grams must voluntarily, knowingly, and with sufficient adjudicative
competence agree to have their cases handled in such diversionary court
systems.124  There is much that remains to be studied in regards to effec-
tive intervention strategies for juvenile offenders, and it may be inappro-
priate to extrapolate assumptions about the effectiveness of such
116 See Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, Assessing the Effectiveness of Jail Diver-
sion Programs for Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Co-Occurring Substance Use Dis-
orders, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 163, 163, 165, 168 (2005).
117 See generally Nahama Broner et al., Criminal Justice Diversion of Individuals with
Co-Occurring Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders: An Overview, in SERVING MEN-
TALLY ILL OFFENDERS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSION-
ALS 83 (Gerald Landsberg et al. eds., 2002); Alexander J. Cowell et al., The Cost-Effectiveness
of Criminal Justice Diversion Programs for People with Serious Mental Illness Co-Occurring
with Substance Abuse: Four Case Studies, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 292, 292–93, 306
(2004).
118 See Frank Sirotich, The Criminal Justice Outcomes of Jail Diversion Programs for
Persons with Mental Illness: A Review of the Evidence, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
461, 461, 465, 469–70 (2009) (examining evidence from twenty-seven studies or publications
supporting the use of diversion initiatives to reduce recidivism and incarceration among adults
with serious mental illness).
119 See Henry J. Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes for Diverted and Nondiverted Jail
Detainees with Mental Illness, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 615, 615–16 (1999).
120 See Pamela K. Lattimore et al., A Comparison of Prebooking and Postbooking Diver-
sion Programs for Mentally Ill Substance-Using Individuals with Justice Involvement, 19 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 30, 30–31, 42 (2003).
121 See Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental
Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 587, 588–89 (2005).
122 See MICHAEL THOMPSON ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR, IMPROVING
RESPONSES TO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL
HEALTH COURT 6–8 (2007).
123 Allison D. Redlich et al., Enrollment in Mental Health Courts: Voluntariness, Know-
ingness, and Adjudicative Competence, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 91, 91 (2010).
124 See Virginia G. Cooper & Patricia A. Zapf, Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of
Miranda Rights, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 390, 390–92 (2008).
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programs from adult treatment programs and apply them to juvenile
treatment programs.125
III. ELIMINATING OR MODIFYING CURRENT COMPETENCY STANDARDS
IN DELINQUENCY CASES
The main difference between juvenile and adult offenders is the in-
herent disparity resulting from their developmental stages.126  The social
contract theory underlying much of the adult criminal justice system, i.e.,
a person is held accountable when he or she breaks the social contract
and engages in unacceptable misconduct,127 is much more difficult to
routinely apply in cases involving adolescents.128  In most jurisdictions,
juveniles either cannot enter into legally binding contracts or such agree-
ments may be voided at the request of the juvenile.129  Our society’s
embrace of social accountability has led to the enactment of numerous
transfer statutes,130 each seeking to increase the punitive response to ju-
venile misconduct131 by removing juveniles from the jurisdiction of juve-
nile courts132 and trying them in adult court systems.133  This move
towards accountability and increasing the punitive response to juvenile
misconduct may well satisfy some general urge to react harshly134 to
125 See Robert J. Zagar et al., Delinquency Best Treatments: How to Divert Youths from
Violence While Saving Lives and Detention Costs, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 381, 381–84, 388
(2013).
126 But see Donald R. Lynam et al., Longitudinal Evidence that Psychopathy Scores in
Early Adolescence Predict Adult Psychopathy, 116 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 155, 155, 161–62
(2007).
127 This theoretical construct is the culmination of several secular philosophers, including
Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and John Rawls. See generally David
McCord & Sandra K. Lyons, Moral Reasoning and the Criminal Law: The Example of Self
Defense, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 114–17; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–14 (2d
ed. 1999).
128 See Michael J. Vitacco & Gina M. Vincent, Applying Adult Concepts to Youthful Of-
fenders: Psychopathy and Its Implications for Risk Assessment and Juvenile Justice, 5 INT’L J.
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 29, 29, 31 (2006).
129 See THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS
§§ 11:9–11:12 (Supp. 2004).
130 See Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen Rushin, Did Changes in Juvenile Sanctions Re-
duce Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural Experiment, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 57–60 (2013).
131 See Mark Fondacaro, The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a Multisystemic Risk Man-
agement Model of Juvenile Justice, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 145, 149 (2011).
132 See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANS-
FER LAWS AND REPORTING 5 (2011).
133 See Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice
Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 71 (2013).
134 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
809 (2003).
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behaviors that appear to have become ever more offensive over time,135
but little consideration has been given to the consequences to the pun-
ished individuals once they are released back into society.136  Moreover,
researchers have given even less attention to whether such transfer provi-
sions137 have actually reduced crime or violence.138  The punitive theo-
ries that underlie adult criminal systems often appear to have serious
backlash effects when they are applied to cases involving juveniles.139
A modern functional juvenile justice system seeking to recognize
and respect the due process rights of the offenders who have been adjudi-
cated delinquent should focus on eliminating, or at least reducing, recidi-
vist misconduct140 as the main systemic goal.141  This is not in any way a
new proposition, or a recently identified systemic goal.  In describing the
evolution of the modern juvenile justice system from the early 1900s,
David Tanenhaus writes:
Although the earliest political battles waged over the ju-
venile court focused on its handling of dependency
cases, progressive child savers were also concerned that
high recidivism rates in delinquency cases, if unchecked,
threatened to undermine the system’s legitimacy.  To
prevent this from happening, Judge Merritt Pinckney as-
sembled a research committee to investigate the problem
of recidivism, which recommended that the juvenile
court install a clinic to study these persistent offenders.
The subsequent opening in 1909 of the Juvenile Psycho-
pathic Institute, the world’s first such institute dedicated
to studying the causes of delinquency, not only trans-
formed the administration of juvenile justice in Chicago
135 See Richard E. Redding, Adult Punishment for Juvenile Offenders: Does It Reduce
Crime?, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 375 (Nancy E. Dowd et al.
eds., 2006).
136 See David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How
(Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1565 (2004).
137 See Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delin-
quency?, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Dep’t Of Justice/Office of Juv. and Delinq. Prevention), June
2010.
138 See Jonathan E. Fielding et al., Recommendation Against Policies Facilitating the
Transfer of Juveniles from Juvenile to Adult Justice Systems for the Purpose of Reducing
Violence, 32 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. S5 (Supp. 4, Apr. 2007)
139 See Jessica Ann Garascia, Note, The Price We Are Willing to Pay for Punitive Justice
in the Juvenile Detention System: Mentally Ill Delinquents and Their Disproportionate Share
of the Burden, 80 IND. L.J. 489, 515 (2005).
140 See John F. Edens & Melissa A. Cahill, Psychopathy in Adolescence and Criminal
Recidivism in Young Adulthood: Longitudinal Results from a Multiethnic Sample of Youthful
Offenders, 14 ASSESSMENT 57, 57 (2007).
141 See Mark W. Lipsey, The Primary Factors That Characterize Effective Interventions
with Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Overview, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 124 (2009).
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but also helped to mold popular understandings of child
development and rearing.  The child savers’ response to
the problem of recidivism thus paved the way for inten-
sive scrutiny of the emotional needs of the nation’s chil-
dren and youth, the vast majority of whom never entered
a juvenile court.142
Identifying the reduction of recidivism as the main objective of the juve-
nile court system as it relates to delinquency cases143 is as compelling
today as it was 1909.144  Our modern juvenile correctional facilities,
however, have frequently failed to achieve any such goal,145 and more
often than not, have been responsible for inflicting additional pain and
suffering upon a population,146 the majority of whom will return to our
communities and their own homes and families.147
While many states have initiated improvements in their detention
facilities148—especially jurisdictions which have emulated reforms pio-
neered in Missouri149—to provide services to juveniles both pre-adjudi-
142 DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE  JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 111 (2004).
143 See John F. Edens et al., Youth Psychopathy and Criminal Recidivism: A Meta-Analy-
sis of the Psychopathy Checklist Measures, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (2007); John F.
Hemphill, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist and Recidivism: Methodological Issues and
Guidelines for Critically Evaluating Empirical Evidence, in THE PSYCHOPATH: THEORY, RE-
SEARCH, & PRACTICE 141–70 (Hugues Herve´ & John C. Yuille eds., 2007).
144 See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
145 See Jeremiah Bourgeois, The Irrelevance of Reform: Maturation in the Department of
Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 159 (2013) (arguing that the juvenile justice system
operates under the pretense of rehabilitation, and, in combination with the criminal justice
system, they fail to recognize the distinction between crimes committed by children and those
committed by adults).
146 See Allen J. Beck & David Cantor, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES REPORTED BY YOUTH: NATIONAL
SURVEY OF YOUTH IN CUSTODY, 2012, at 9 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/svjfry12.pdf.
147 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 290–306 (2014) (describing the violence and torture R
of children for more than a century at the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys in Marianna,
Florida, up until 2011, despite more than a dozen official inquiries, including by a Florida
grand jury and the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency).
148 See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE
CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 34–39 (2011), available at http://
www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlaceForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf (describing suggested
reforms for juvenile correctional facilities but arguing that, ultimately, states should try to limit
the number of juveniles in detention).
149 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE POLI-
CIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE (2009), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/
upload/09_05_rep_costsofconfinement_jj_ps.pdf; Richard B. Teitelman & Gregory J.
Linhares, Juvenile Detention Reform in Missouri: Improving Lives, Improving Public Safety,
and Saving Money, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2011, 2011 (2013) (discussing the Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation’s efforts in Missouri to promote evidence-based pretrial juvenile detention practices,
treatment programs, and monitoring of juveniles); see also RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUNDATION, THE MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING
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cation150 and post-adjudication,151 many initiatives tend to be somewhat
short lived, as funding evaporates, and state budgetary constraints force
states to prioritize other spending.152
There is much to learn from the jurisdictions that have implemented
“restorative justice” models, and many decisions that state legislatures
may face as more information about the successes of these alternative
correctional programs develop.153  However, crafting a new definition
for juvenile competency will achieve very little should states not provide
adequate funding to address the issues that contribute greatly to the de-
termination that so many of these young people are not competent to
stand trial.154  Following in the pathway of the status quo, which often
embraces so-called juvenile competence restoration courses, or programs
that may offer little more than repeated identification of the various par-
ties involved in juvenile trial proceedings155 or the roles of the individu-
als along with recitation of the basic rights of the juveniles, does little to
YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (2010), available at http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-Mis-
souriModelFullreport-2010.pdf.
150 See Joseph J. Cocozza et al., Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System: The Miami-
Dade Juvenile Assessment Center Post-Arrest Diversion Program, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MIS-
USE 935, 937 (2005).
151 See NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFILES, 2005
(2012), available at http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/1State_Juvenile_Justice_Profiles_2005.pdf.
Some of these listed states have restorative justice legislation specifically for juveniles.  Some
of these states have legislation that covers adult and juvenile courts concurrently.  States with
restorative justice legislation include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Loui-
siana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. See also Marlyce Nuzum, Summaries of
State Restorative Justice Legislation, STOPVIOLENCE.COM, http://www.stopviolence.com/restor
ative/rjleg-detail.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
152 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 149. R
153 See Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 251 (2005) (providing an
overview of the history and current research on the restorative justice movement); Gabrielle
Maxwell & Allison Morris, Youth Justice in New Zealand: Restorative Justice in Practice?, 62
J. OF SOC. ISSUES 239, 245–46 (2006) (New Zealand’s juvenile justice system is almost en-
tirely based upon restorative justice, except for murder, manslaughter, arson and aggravated
robbery offenses).
154 See MARK W. LIPSEY ET AL., CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, IMPROVING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE 9–10, 48–50 (2010), available at http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pdfs/ebp/ebppaper.pdf
(describing the challenges faced by states to adequately fund evidence-based juvenile justice
programs).
155 But see Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Teaching Adolescents and Adults About Adjudicative
Proceedings: A Comparison of Pre- and Post-Teaching Scores on the MacCAT-CA, 31 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 419, 428 (2007) (analyzing study results wherein teaching associated with 927
youths and 466 young adults who completed the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-
Criminal Adjudication, the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument—Second Version, and
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence showed adolescents aged thirteen and younger
were less likely than older individuals to improve competency scores with teaching courses).
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advance the interests of the community or the individual juveniles found
to be lacking in competence.156
A. Limiting Juvenile Competency
One response to the current state statutory provisions for juvenile
competency would be to eliminate all legal competency presumptions for
children aged fourteen and under.  Such juveniles would be presumed not
to be competent.157  In all instances, should the state seek to bring a
juvenile to trial (adjudication), the state would bear the legal burden of
proving the juvenile’s competency.158  This process would essentially
neutralize the current legal presumption of juvenile competency in both
juvenile delinquent and adult criminal cases.159  The data documenting
the highly elevated rates of mental illness160 and developmental imma-
turity within the population of accused delinquents would lead to the
conclusion that the default position for juvenile and adult criminal courts
should be the application of a neutral legal presumption of
competency.161
The application of this new legal principle does not eliminate the
accountability of juveniles for misconduct that is petitioned prior to the
adolescent turning whatever threshold age the jurisdiction adopts, but it
156 See, e.g., Ronald Schouten, Commentary: Training for Competence—Form or Sub-
stance?, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 202, 202 (2003) (criticizing practices of “compe-
tency restoration programs” which overlook the ability of the individual to meaningfully
participate in the trial process).
157 See Lois B. Oberlander et al., Preadolescent Adjudicative Competence: Methodologi-
cal Considerations and Recommendations for Practice Standards, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 545,
545 (2001).
158 See Richard E. Redding et al., What Judges and Lawyers Think About the Testimony
of Mental Health Experts: A Survey of the Courts and Bar, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 583, 591–93
(2001) (arguing, based on a survey, that Virginia judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
find the testimony of psychiatrists more probative on questions of competency than other
forms of expert testimony, and suggesting that mental health and social science professionals
help educate the courts and bar about the value of research data and statistically based
information).
159 See Darla M.R. Burnett et al., Adjudicative Competency in a Juvenile Population, 31
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 438, 461 (2004) (arguing, based on a psychological study utilizing the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication, that “adolescents below the
ages of 15 to 16 years cannot be assumed to be competent” to stand trial).
160 “[Adult] individuals with serious and often disabling mental illnesses like schizophre-
nia, bipolar disorder, and major depression are grossly overrepresented in the criminal justice
system . . . .  Moreover . . . nearly three out of every four jail detainees with a serious mental
illness have a co-occurring substance abuse disorder.”  Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional
Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction,
35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 110 (2011).
161 See Jennifer M. Cox et al., The Impact of Juveniles’ Ages and Levels of Psychosocial
Maturity on Judges’ Opinions About Adjudicative Competence, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 21,
21 (2012) (reviewing 342 judges’ responses to the age and maturity of juveniles which play
major roles in decisions on juvenile competency).
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does prevent the juveniles from being adjudicated delinquent at the ear-
lier stages of adolescence,162 and it also eliminates the collateral conse-
quences of such adjudications later in the juvenile’s life.163
In stark contrast to the juvenile delinquency laws of most U.S.
states, foreign jurisdictions have recognized some of the developmental
limitations of adolescents and established higher threshold requirements
for holding juveniles accountable for misconduct.  In some such foreign
jurisdictions, criminal responsibility cannot occur in the legal system un-
til minors reach the age of fifteen.164  In Great Britain, under the Chil-
dren and Young Persons Act of 1933,165 criminal responsibility could
occur under the criminal justice statutes as young as eight years of
age;166 however, there is a rebuttable legal presumption that children be-
tween the ages of ten and fourteen cannot distinguish between right and
wrong, and are therefore, incapable of committing a crime.167  British
courts handling juvenile misconduct168 separate adolescent capacities
into three categories: (1) a conclusive presumption that children under
the age of ten cannot be held criminally responsible for their behavior;
(2) children between the ages of ten and fourteen can be held criminally
responsible for misconduct, but the prosecution must first satisfy a
heightened burden of proof that the child committed a criminal act, but
also that the act was committed with “mischievous discretion,” or that
they were able to understand the difference between right and wrong;
and (3) children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen—where the
legal presumption of incapacity is no longer applied—and the law
162 The fiscal consequences of preventing youth reoffending are not insignificant, as well.
See M.A. Cohen, The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 5 (2013).
163 This might include the enhanced sentencing provisions of the federal sentencing act
based upon juvenile delinquency adjudications (convictions), should the juvenile become in-
volved in the federal criminal system later in life, in addition to impacting the child’s educa-
tional opportunities, employability, and other consequences. See Jeremiah Rygus, Collateral
Damage: Saddling Youth with a Lifetime of Consequences, 26 CRIM. JUST. 37, 37 (2012).
164 In Finland, children below the age of fifteen involved in delinquent misconduct are
referred to the social services agencies, rather than juvenile justice or adult criminal systems.
See Tapio Lappi-Seppa¨la¨, Finland: A Model of Tolerance?, in COMPARATIVE YOUTH JUSTICE
177 (John Muncie & Barry Goldson eds., 2006).
165 See Children and Young Person’s Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 12 (Eng.).
166 See Glanville L. Williams, The Criminal Responsibility of Children, 1954 CRIM. L.
REV. 493.
167 See Stephanie J. Millet, Note, The Age of Criminal Responsibility in an Era of Vio-
lence: Has Great Britain Set a New International Standard?, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295,
305 (1995).
168 In Britain, separate juvenile courts do not exist; rather, special sittings of Magistrates’
Court hear juvenile matters. See RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A
SURVEY 85 (1992).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 27  2-APR-15 9:23
2015] ELIMINATING THE COMPETENCY PRESUMPTION 429
presumes that these children are fully responsible for their mis-
conduct.169
The age of criminal responsibility in Belgium is eighteen (or sixteen
for certain more serious offenses).170  In France, the minimum age of
criminal responsibility for juveniles is thirteen years (yet children as
young as ten can appear before judges who impose community or educa-
tional orders).171  Despite a rising crime rate among juvenile offenders in
France, the country has not lowered the age of criminal responsibility.172
In Sweden, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is fifteen
years.173  In Japan, the minimum age of criminal responsibility for
juveniles is fourteen years.174  In the former Soviet Union, the minimum
age of criminal responsibility for juveniles was sixteen for most
offenses.175
Countries other than the United States have adopted legal provisions
that hold juveniles accountable for criminal misconduct at later stages of
adolescent development than does the U.S.  These foreign statutes and
court procedures effectively raise the age of criminal responsibility of
adolescents within their jurisdictions, resulting in a similar outcome to
this competency presumption proposal.  The United States is now the
only country—other than Somalia—not to adopt or ratify the single most
important international treaty in this area, the United Nations’ Conven-
tion of the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).176  According to the UNCRC’s
169 J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 189 (7th ed. 1992).
170 THE HOWARD LEAGUE FOR PENAL REFORM, PUNISHING CHILDREN: A SURVEY OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND APPROACHES ACROSS EUROPE 3 (2008), available at www
.howardleague.org/fileadmin/howard_league/user/online_publications/Punishing_Children
.pdf.
171 TERRILL, supra note 168, at 162. R
172 Code Pe´nal [C. P ´EN.] art. 122-8 (FR).
173 TERRILL, supra note 168, at 229. R
174 See id. at 286.
175 Id. at 396.
176 See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/crc.pdf.  The
1989 UNCRC contains many provisions affecting children in conflict with the law.  Key arti-
cles of the UNCRC concerning youth justice are Articles 3, 37 and 40.  Article 3 provides that
in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare insti-
tutions, Courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.  Parties undertake to ensure the child
receives such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, and, to this end,
shall take appropriate legislative and administrative measures. Id. art. 3, ¶ 2.  Article 37 pro-
vides for minimum standards in treatment and punishment of juvenile offenders, to ensure that
“no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment.” Id. art. 37(a).  It also provides that “neither capital punishment nor life imprison-
ment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age.” Id.  Importantly, Article 37(b) provides that “no child shall be deprived
of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. Id. art. 37(b).  The arrest, detention or imprison-
ment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last
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International Committee on the Rights of the Child, the age of criminal
responsibility in other UN member countries includes the following:
Albania, 16 years old; Andorra, 16 years old; Angola, 16 years old; Ar-
gentina, 18 years old; Armenia, 16 years old; Azerbaijan, 16 years old;
Bahrain, 15 years old; Belarus, 16 years old; Benin, 13 years old; Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 14 years old; Bulgaria, 14 years old; Cape Verde, 16
years old; Central African Republic, 14 years old; Chile, 16 years old;
China, 16 years old; Croatia, 14 years old; Cuba, 16 years old; Czech
Republic, 15 years old; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 14 years
old; Denmark, 15 years old; Equatorial Guinea, 18 years old; Estonia, 15
years old; Georgia, 16 years old; Guinea-Bissau, 16 years old; Kazakh-
stan, 16 years old; Kyrgyzstan, 16 years old; Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 15 years old; Latvia, 16 years old; Liberia, 16 years old; Lib-
yan Arab Jamahiriya, 14 years old; Liechtenstein, 14 years old; Lithua-
nia, 16 years old; Luxembourg, 16 years old; Macedonia, Former
Yugoslav Republic, 14 years old; Maldives, 15 years old; Mali, 13 years
old; Marshall Islands, 14 years old; Mauritania, 14 years old; Monaco, 13
years old; Mongolia, 16 years old; Mozambique, 16 years old; New Zea-
land, 14 years old; Norway, 15 years old; Panama, 14 years old; Para-
guay, 14 years old; Portugal, 16 years old; Republic of Korea, 14 years
old; Republic of Moldova, 16 years old; Romania, 14 years old; Russian
Federation, 16 years old; Rwanda, 14 years old; Sao Tome and Principe,
16 years old; Slovakia, 15 years old; Slovenia, 14 years old; Somalia, 14/
15 years old; Spain, 14 years old; Sweden, 15 years old; Tajikistan, 16
years old; Turkmenistan, 16 years old; Uruguay, 18 years old; Uzbeki-
stan, 16 years old; Vietnam, 16 years old; Yugoslavia, 14 years old.177
This extensive list of nations which recognize that children should not be
held legally accountable for criminal misconduct until they reach four-
teen years of age or older, is not intended to advance the argument that
the U.S. must follow suit.  Rather, it is intended to demonstrate that a
broad base of other nations has already concluded that juveniles should
resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.” Id. Article 40 provides for recognition
of the welfare, dignity and privacy of the child by ensuring that parties treat children:
[I]n a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and
worth, which reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of others and which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability
of promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in
society.
Id. art. 40, ¶ 1.  Details of each country’s signing, along with additional interpretive declara-
tions and reservations, can be found on the Information on the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
177 International Comparative Information on the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibil-
ity, AMAZONAWS, http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/030310minimumage.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2015).
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not be presumed legally competent and held accountable in criminal pro-
ceedings for their misconduct until they reach an older threshold age than
that adopted in the United States.  By eliminating the current legal pre-
sumption that juveniles are competent to stand trial, the various state
legislatures would be joining an impressive group of foreign countries
that do not view this as a radical or inappropriately lenient response to
adolescent misconduct.
B. Modifying the Legal Definition of Juvenile Competency
A separate and distinct proposal for modification of the current
competency paradigm would involve expanding the factors used in the
determination of juvenile competency, adding developmental immatur-
ity178 and mental illness to the Dusky factors present in most state provi-
sions.179  Because the vast majority of juvenile delinquency cases and
criminal cases involving juveniles transferred into adult systems180 are
held in state court systems, individual state legislatures should be ap-
proached to re-examine current statutory definitions of juvenile compe-
tency,181 and to update their statutes by incorporating developmental
immaturity and mental illness as factors comprising main components of
their statutory definition.182  The MacArthur Foundation’s longitudinal
study on juvenile competence provides a solid foundation for the amend-
ing of current statutory schemes that fail to incorporate developmental
immaturity as an issue for mental health professionals to include in their
competency evaluations.183
Of course, the process of waiting for the juveniles to mature so that
they become capable of participating in their delinquency adjudications
need not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction over the accused offend-
ers.184  Similarly, if adjudications are delayed as a result of a juvenile’s
mental health problems,185 then using the time effectively while
juveniles receive specialized mental health treatments—such as multisys-
178 See Cox et al., supra note 161, at 25 (“Currently, few statutes governing the standards R
for rulings of incompetence to stand trial recognize immaturity as an independent basis for
incompetence.”).
179 See Thomas Riffin, Competence to Stand Trial Evaluations with Juveniles, 32 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 15, 16 (2006).
180 See Ivan P. Kruh et al., Historical and Personality Correlates to the Violence of
Juveniles Tried as Adults, 32 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 69, 70 (2005).
181 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 1082. R
182 See David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerg-
ing Issues Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. &
MED. 503, 516 (2006).
183 MacArthur Study, supra note 95. R
184 See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17
Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 26 (2000).
185 See Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Offenders and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL.
& L. 143, 144 (1999).
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temic therapy186—or medications does not divest the juvenile court of
jurisdiction over these adolescents.187  During this waiting process,188 the
court might provide a variety of treatment programs designed to address
the specific behavioral or mental health problems189 identified during the
competency assessment process.190  Tate and Redding have been quick
to note, however, that the term “treatment” carries different meanings in
juvenile justice systems and mental health systems.191  It is a broader
concept used interchangeably with “rehabilitation” or efforts to help de-
linquents modify offending and antisocial behavior, frequently relying on
standard mental health interventions such as individual therapy, and fam-
ily therapy.192  Such intervention services should be relied upon only to
the extent that evidence-based reviews can document the effectiveness of
the interventions.193
The term “treatment” as used in a mental health context, by compar-
ison, is tied to psychiatric or medical models focused on “alleviating
symptoms.”  These distinctions are reflective of the systems rather than
the needs of the juveniles.194  By adopting “treatment” services as under-
stood in the medical context, the scope of the involvement of the medical
and mental health providers—psychologists, social workers, and psychi-
atrists—would expand far beyond the artificial limitations imposed under
the fifty-plus-year-old legal decision of Dusky.195  The overall objective
186 See CYNTHIA CULPIT SWENSON ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC THERAPY AND NEIGHBOR-
HOOD PARTNERSHIPS: REDUCING ADOLESCENT VIOLENCE AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE (2009); Ei-
leen C. Murphy, Multisystemic Therapy in Juvenile Justice System: Changing Punishment into
Treatment, 25 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 29 (2005).
187 See James Preis, Advocacy for the Mental Health Needs of Children in California, 31
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 937, 937–44 (1998).
188 See Greg Wolber, The Unreasonable Incompetent Defendant: Length of Attempted
Restoration and Factors Contributing to a Decision of Unrestorable, 26 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. 63 (2008).
189 See Kathleen R. Skowyra et al., Blueprint for Change: A Comprehensive Model for
the Identification and Treatment for Youth with Mental Health Needs in Contact with the
Juvenile Justice System, in REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE (2007).
190 See Karen L. Cropsey et al., Predictors of Involvement in the Juvenile Justice System
Among Psychiatric Hospitalized Adolescents, 33 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 942 (2008).
191 David C. Tate & Richard E. Redding, Mental Health and Rehabilitative Services in
Juvenile Justice: System Reforms and Innovative Approaches, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PRE-
VENTION, ASSESSMENT, & INTERVENTION 134, 134–35.
192 See Michael D. Pullman et al., Juvenile Offenders with Mental Health Needs: Reduc-
ing Recidivism Using Wraparound, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 375, 387 (2006).
193 See Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Pol-
icy and Practice, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1–3 (2009).
194 Id.
195 See Robert D. Hoge, An Expanded Role for Psychological Assessments in Juvenile
Justice Systems, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 251, 260 (1999).
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of revising competency standards should remain as reducing
recidivism.196
Should state statutory provisions on competence be redrafted, it may
be that juvenile courts would assume more of the traits of specialized
mental health courts197 while the competency of the juveniles remains in
doubt or goes undocumented.198  The principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence,199 or the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal
rule or practice promotes the psychological or physical wellbeing of the
people it affects,200 should be applied to the process of redrafting compe-
tency statutes.201  Should this develop, jurisdictions would need to be
aware of the results of existing mental health courts202 and their effec-
tiveness203 in reducing recidivism and violence.204  Intensive case man-
agement for those juveniles found to be lacking in competency should be
a significant component in redeveloping the juvenile justice system.205
Incorporating “collaboration”206 at the county level of agency service
providers to ensure optimum supervision and services to juveniles in the
196 See Jennifer L. Skeem, Sarah Manchak & Jillian K. Peterson, Correctional Policy for
Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 110, 111 (2011).
197 ELLEN HARRIS & TAMMY SELTZER, THE ROLE OF SPECIALTY MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS IN MEETING THE NEEDS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS 3 (2004), available at www.bazelon
.org/issues/criminalization/juvenilejustice.
198 See Gwen Levitt & Jeffrey Trollinger, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: Chal-
lenges, Frustrations and Rewards of Restoration Training, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY
57 (2002).
199 See Kathryn C. Sammon, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Examination of Problem-
Solving Justice in New York, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 923, 923–29 (2008).
200 David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 220, 224 (1995).
201 See Gene Griffin & Michael J. Jenuwine, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Bridge
the Juvenile Justice and Mental Health Systems, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 66–67, 87 (2002).
202 See Patrick Gardner, An Overview of Juvenile Mental Health Courts, 30 ABA CHILD
LAW PRAC. 101, 101–02 (2011).
203 See Michael Caldwell et al., Treatment Response of Adolescent Offenders with Psy-
chopathy Features: A Two-Year Follow-Up, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 571, 584, 590–93
(2006).
204 See Dale E. McNiel & Rene´e L. Binder, Effectiveness of a Mental Health Court in
Reducing Criminal Recidivism and Violence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1395, 1395 (2007);
Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski, Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts:
Challenges and Recommendations, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 539, 539 (2005); Marlee E.
Moore & Virginia A. Hiday, Mental Health Court Outcomes: A Comparison of Re-Arrest and
Re-Arrest Severity Between Mental Health Court and Traditional Court Participants, 30 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 659, 659 (2006); Merith Cosden et al., Efficacy of a Mental Health Treatment
Court with Assertive Community Treatment, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 199, 199–200, 211 (2005).
205 See David Loveland & Michael Boyle, Intensive Case Management as a Jail Diver-
sion Program for People with a Serious Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature, 51 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 130, 133–45 (2007).
206 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & CRIME AND JUSTICE INST., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED
PRINCIPLES IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: LEADING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOP-
MENT (2004), available at http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/BASICS2-EBP.pdf.
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system207 should be another essential component208 of any court-ordered
pre-adjudication program utilized either until the juvenile matures suffi-
ciently to be found competent,209 or until an alternative to delinquency
adjudication is found to be appropriate.210
Current state statutes, which define juvenile competency based upon
paradigms applicable to adult offenders, fail to incorporate the vast body
of research conducted on and about adolescents and their behaviors over
the past five decades.  Current statutes, which define juvenile compe-
tency based on extrapolations from the Supreme Court’s Dusky decision,
fail to recognize the historical context in which that case occurred, let
alone the fact that, at the time of Dusky, child and adolescent psychiatry
and psychology were in the earliest stages of development.  However
appropriate it was to apply the Dusky standard over the past decades,
today, additional factors of developmental immaturity and mental illness,
at the very least, should be incorporated into legal statutes defining juve-
nile competency,211 or, in the alternative, the legal presumption of com-
petency as applied to juveniles should simply be abolished.
As for a recommended protocol for legislatures reconfiguring their
juvenile competency laws, states that utilize teams of mental health ex-
perts (i.e. psychiatrists and psychologists) to perform competency evalu-
ations should follow a two-step process.  First, the psychologist(s) should
be appointed to conduct psychometric tests.  Second, after these psycho-
metric tests have been administered, results compiled and diagnoses de-
termined, the final reports should then be provided to the psychiatrists,
and other members of the competency evaluation team.212  This allows
the psychometric test results to be considered by mental health profes-
sionals—who might otherwise rely on mental status examinations or in-
207 See PETER LEONE ET AL., COLLABORATION IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
YOUTH SERVING AGENCIES: IMPROVING PREVENTION, PROVIDING MORE EFFICIENT SERVICES,
AND REDUCING RECIDIVISM FOR YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES (2002).
208 See KERRY BAKER & ALEX SUTHERLAND, MULTI-AGENCY PUBLIC PROTECTION AR-
RANGEMENTS AND YOUTH JUSTICE (2009).
209 See Royce Baerger et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicated and Petitioned
Juvenile Defendants, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 314, 316–20 (2003).
210 See N. Prabha Unnithan & Janis Johnston, Collaboration in Juvenile Justice: A Multi-
Agency Study, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2012, at 22; Jeffrey M. Jenson & Cathryn C. Potter, The
Effects of Cross-System Collaboration on Mental Health and Substance Abuse Problems of
Detained Youth, 13 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 588, 599–604 (2003).
211 See Jodi L. Viljoen & Twila Wingrove, Adjudicative Competence in Adolescent De-
fendants: Judges’ and Defense Attorneys’ Views of Legal Standards for Adolescents in Juve-
nile and Criminal Court, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 204, 204–06 (2008).
212 See Patricia A. Zapf et al., Have the Courts Abdicated Their Responsibility for Deter-
mination of Competency to Stand Trial to Clinicians?, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 27,
39–42 (2004).
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terviews of the juveniles without any additional objective data.213
Presently, many jurisdictions fail to specify this procedure,214 and the
end result may be that various mental health experts are forced into mak-
ing recommendations about juvenile competency without the benefit of
their colleagues’ psychometric test results, often resulting in a lack of
consensus among the evaluators.215
A crucial step in the redrafting of competency laws would be for
members of a state legislature to work in conjunction with members of
the mental health profession during the process of adopting a new com-
petency standard that incorporates developmental immaturity and mental
illness as factors for evaluation.216  The application of a legal doctrine
that appears to be decades out of date217 by the professionals who are
compelled to perform the competency evaluations and assessments218 is
reason enough to include these non-lawyers in the process of drafting
language of the new competency requirements.219
CONCLUSION
The process of creating a competency standard based upon the col-
lective wisdom of members of the Supreme Court’s understanding of
adolescent behavioral development from fifty years in the past ignores
the progress identified by science and social science over five decades of
time, which could significantly improve the juvenile justice system’s
ability to reduce recidivism and violent behaviors220 of those children
involved in the court system.221  By virtue of advocating for statutory
213 See Michael L. Perlin, “Everything’s a Little Upside Down, As a Matter of Fact the
Wheels Have Stopped”: The Fraudulence of the Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239, 244–45 (2004).
214 See Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial
with Evidence-Based Practice, 37 J. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 452–53 (2009).
215 See W. Neil Gowensmith et al., Field Reliability of Competence to Stand Trial Opin-
ions: How Often Do Evaluators Agree, and What Do Judges Decide When Evaluators Disa-
gree?, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 130, 130 (2012); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 65, at 8–9. R
216 Id.
217 See D. A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Prac-
tice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39, 41–42 (2010).
218 See D. A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future of Risk and/or Need
Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 22–23 (2006).
219 See Grisso, supra note 14, at 373–74. R
220 See T.E. MOFFITT, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRES-
SION, A REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON THE TAXONOMY OF LIFE-COURSE PERSISTENT VERSUS ADO-
LESCENCE-LIMITED ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR (D. J. Flannery et al. eds., 2007).
221 Certainly not all youths will become adult offenders, and the work of Moffitt (1993,
2007) has suggested that the majority of antisocial behavior in youths is adolescence limited,
with a minority of youths becoming adult offenders.  Risk is arguably dynamic, and this may
be particularly so for youths, given the developmental transitions inherent within adolescence.
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change on a state-by-state basis, the strengths of federalism222 may be
realized, in that a single competency statute need not be adopted across
the country.  States legislatures are free to determine the language of
their individual requirements for competency,223 and then, over time,
they might modify their initial enactments after assessing the impact and
effectiveness of other states’ statutory language on juvenile compe-
tency.224  This legislative process would place the keys of change in the
hands of the jurisdictions charged not only with the responsibility of ad-
dressing juvenile delinquency, but also with handling the reintegration of
those juveniles as they move out of delinquency systems and back into
their home communities.225  There is no initial need for a one-size-fits-all
solution for the statutory language or procedure of juvenile competency
in all fifty states.226
In 2013, Robert Schwartz, cofounder of the Juvenile Law Center in
Philadelphia, two-time chair of the American Bar Association’s Criminal
Justice Section’s Juvenile Justice Committee, and recipient of the ABA’s
Livingston Hall Award, argued that state legislatures had been quietly
and steadily finding “a new balance in juvenile justice policy between
protecting the public and holding youth accountable in developmentally
appropriate ways.”227  Schwartz identified these new laws as the result of
Mark E. Olver et al., Short and Long-Term Prediction of Recidivism Using the Youth Level of
Service/Case Management Inventory in a Sample of Serious Young Offenders, 36 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 331, 333 (2012).
222 Although the actual word “federalism” does not appear in the text of the U.S. Consti-
tution, it is considered a constitutional principle stretching beyond the list of limitations of
congressional power over the states articulated in Article I, Section 10, and described by the
Court in anti-commandeering cases such as New York v. United States, 488 U.S. 1041 (1992).
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2009).
223 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 1074–75. R
224 This process would be consistent with Justice Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in the New
State Ice Co. case:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.  De-
nial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
225 See He Len Chung et al., An Empirical Portrait of Community Reentry Among Serious
Juvenile Offenders in Two Metropolitan Cities, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1402, 1404–08
(2007); YOUTH JUSTICE BD., STOP THE REVOLVING DOOR: GIVING COMMUNITIES AND YOUTH
THE TOOLS TO OVERCOME RECIDIVISM: RECOMMENDATIONS ON JUVENILE REENTRY IN NEW
YORK CITY (2005).
226 See KATHLEEN R. SKOWYRA & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: A COM-
PREHENSIVE MODEL FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF YOUTH WITH MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS IN CONTACT WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3–7 (2007), available at
http://www.ncmhjj.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2007_Blueprint-for-Change-Full-Report
.pdf.
227 Robert G. Schwartz, State Laws Rooted in Principles of Adolescent Development, 27
CRIM. JUST. 52 (2013).
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bipartisan cooperation that saved communities money, decreased recidi-
vism, and recognized adolescent development; but still held youth ac-
countable while preserving opportunities for them to become capable
members of society.228  State legislatures may continue on this path by
amending current or adopting new statutory provisions of juvenile com-
petency to take into consideration the advancements in child psychiatry,
child psychology, neurology, child developmental biology, assessment
instruments229 for adolescent risk factors and future recidivism230 over
the past fifty years and subsequent to the Dusky decision recognizing
developmental immaturity as well as mental illness, rational factual un-
derstanding, and the ability to assist counsel as cornerstones in the legal
requirements before placing children on trial for delinquent or criminal
misconduct.
228 Id.
229 See Mark E. Olver et al., Risk Assessment with Young Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of
Three Assessment Measures, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 329, 329–30 (2009); Craig S.
Schwalbe, Risk Assessment for Juvenile Justice: A Meta-Analysis, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
449, 449–59 (2007).
230 See Fred Schmidt et al., Comparative Analyses of the YLS/CMI, SAVRY, and PCL:YV
in Adolescent Offenders: A 10-Year Follow-Up into Adulthood, 9 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV.
JUST. 23, 23–24 (2011).
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APPENDIX
VARIOUS STATE STATUTES DEFINING JUVENILE
COMPETENCY
ALASKA—ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.100 (West 2014): No mention
of juveniles in the statute.
• “A defendant who, as a result of mental disease or defect, is in-
competent because the defendant is unable to understand the pro-
ceedings against the defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own
defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commis-
sion of a crime so long as the incompetency exists.”
• (f) “In determining if the defendant is unable to understand the
proceedings against the defendant, the court shall consider, among
other factors considered relevant by the court, whether the defen-
dant understands that the defendant has been charged with a crim-
inal offense and that penalties can be imposed; whether the
defendant understands what criminal conduct is being alleged;
whether the defendant understands the roles of the judge, jury,
prosecutor, and defense counsel; whether the defendant under-
stands that the defendant will be expected to tell defense counsel
the circumstances, to the best of the defendant’s ability, surround-
ing the defendant’s activities at the time of the alleged criminal
conduct; and whether the defendant can distinguish between a
guilty and not guilty plea.”
• (g) “In determining if the defendant is unable to assist in the de-
fendant’s own defense, the court shall consider, among other fac-
tors considered relevant by the court, whether the defendant’s
mental disease or defect affects the defendant’s ability to recall
and relate facts pertaining to the defendant’s actions at times rele-
vant to the charges and whether the defendant can respond coher-
ently to counsel’s questions.  A defendant is able to assist in the
defense even though the defendant’s memory may be impaired,
the defendant refuses to accept a course of action that counsel or
the court believes is in the defendant’s best interest, or the defen-
dant is unable to suggest a particular strategy or to choose among
alternative defenses.”
ARIZONA—ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291 (West 2011): (2) “‘Incom-
petent’ means a juvenile who does not have sufficient present ability to
consult with the juvenile’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding or who does not have a rational and factual understanding
of the proceedings against the juvenile. Age alone does not render a
person incompetent.” (emphasis added)
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ARKANSAS—ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-502(a)(1) (West 2014): Subsec-
tion (b) of the statute requires the prosecution to overcome three pre-
sumptions by a preponderance of the evidence to prosecute a juvenile
under the age of thirteen at the time of the alleged offense:
• Possess the necessary mental state required for the offense
charged;
• Conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law; and
• Appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct.
CALIFORNIA—CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 709 (West 2014): Sub-
section (a) states, “A minor is incompetent to proceed if he or she lacks
sufficient present ability to consult with counsel and assist in preparing
his or her defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or
lacks a rational as well as factual understanding, of the nature of the
charges or proceedings against him or her.  If the court finds substantial
evidence raises a doubt as to the minor’s competency, the proceedings
shall be suspended.”
• “Upon suspension of proceedings, the court shall order that the
question of the minor’s competence be determined at a hearing.
The court shall appoint an expert to evaluate whether the minor
suffers from a mental disorder, developmental disability, develop-
mental immaturity, or other condition and, if so, whether the con-
dition or conditions impair the minor’s competency.”
COLORADO—COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-1301 (West 2014): (2) “A ju-
venile shall not be tried or sentenced if the juvenile is incompetent to
proceed, as defined in section 16-8.5-101(11), C.R.S., at that stage of the
proceedings against him or her.”
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8.5-101 (West 2014): “(11) ‘Incompetent to pro-
ceed’ means that, as a result of a mental disability or developmental disa-
bility, the defendant does not have sufficient present ability to consult
with the defendant’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing in order to assist in the defense, or that, as a result of a mental
disability or developmental disability, the defendant does not have a ra-
tional and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.”
CONNECTICUT—CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56d (West 2014): No stat-
ute for juveniles.  (a) “COMPETENCY REQUIREMENT. DEFINITION. A de-
fendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is
not competent.  For the purposes of this section, a defendant is not com-
petent if the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against
him or her or to assist in his or her own defense.”
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DELAWARE—DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1007A (West 2014): “Not
competent” shall mean a child who is unable to understand the nature of
the proceedings against the child, or to give evidence in the child’s own
defense or to instruct counsel on the child’s own behalf.
• Subsection (c)(3): If the Court finds that a child is not competent
and is unable to have competency timely restored or acquired, the
Court, after a hearing to consider the best interests of the child
and the safety of the community, shall:
° “Dismiss nonviolent misdemeanor charges within 6 to 12
months”;
° “Dismiss violent misdemeanor or nonviolent felony charges
within 12 to 24 months”;
° “Dismiss violent felony charges at age 18, unless the child was
under age 14 at the time of arrest for violent felonies in which
case the Court shall consider dismissal of violent felonies
within 18 to 36 months.”
FLORIDA—FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19 (West 2014): Subsection (1)(f)
states, “A child is competent to proceed if the child has sufficient present
ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational un-
derstanding and the child has a rational and factual understanding of the
present proceedings.  The report must address the child’s capacity to”:
° “Appreciate the charges or allegations against the child”;
° “Appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties that may
be imposed in the proceedings against the child, if applicable”;
° “Understand the adversarial nature of the legal process”;
° “Disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the proceedings at
issue”;
° “Display appropriate courtroom behavior”;
° “Testify relevantly.”
• (3) “If the court finds that a child has mental illness, intellectual
disability, or autism and adjudicates the child incompetent to pro-
ceed, the court must also determine whether the child meets the
criteria for secure placement.  A child may be placed in a secure
facility or program if the court makes a finding by clear and con-
vincing evidence that:
• The child has mental illness, intellectual disability, or autism and
because of the mental illness, intellectual disability, or autism:
° The child is manifestly incapable of surviving with the help of
willing and responsible family or friends, including available
alternative services, and without treatment or training the child
is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for self, and
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 39  2-APR-15 9:23
2015] ELIMINATING THE COMPETENCY PRESUMPTION 441
such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of sub-
stantial harm to the child’s well-being; or
° There is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the child
will inflict serious bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced
by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such
harm.”
GEORGIA—GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-651 (West 2014): “(3) ‘Incompe-
tent to proceed’ means lacking sufficient present ability to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings, to comprehend his or her own situ-
ation in relation to the proceedings, and to assist his or her attorney in the
preparation and presentation of his or her case in all adjudication, dispo-
sition, or transfer hearings. Such term shall include consideration of a
child’s age or immaturity.”
HAWAII—HAW. REV. STAT. §704-403 to 704-418 (West 2014): “No
person who as a result of a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against the person or to as-
sist in the person’s own defense shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced
for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.”
IDAHO—IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-519A (West 2014): “(2) A juvenile is
competent to proceed if he or she has”:
° “A sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding”;
° “A rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
against him or her”; and
° “The capacity to assist in preparing his or her defense.”
ILLINOIS—725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/104-10 (West 2014): Dusky
standard
• No mention of juveniles in the general competency statute.
INDIANA—IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-36-3-1 (West 2014): Adult Standard.
“Sec. 1. (a) If at any time before the final submission of any criminal
case to the court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable
grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand
the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense, the court shall
immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant
has that ability.”
• However, the adult standard does not apply to juveniles. In re
K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004): “Principles of fundamen-
tal fairness require that this right be afforded in juvenile proceed-
ings.  Thus, we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of
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Appeals on this issue.  We disagree with our colleagues, however,
on the applicability of the adult competency statute.”
IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-32-12-1 (West 2014): Provides mental health
evaluations for juveniles.
IOWA—IOWA CODE. ANN. § 812.3 to 812.9 (West 2014): (1) “If at any
stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the defendant’s attorney,
upon application to the court, alleges specific facts showing that the de-
fendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant
from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting
effectively in the defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings
and determine if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations.”
KANSAS—KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2348 (West 2014): (a) “For the pur-
pose of this section, a person charged as a juvenile is incompetent for
adjudication as a juvenile offender if, because of mental illness or defect,
such person is unable to”:
° “Understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings”; or
° “Make or assist in making a defense.”
KENTUCKY—KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100 to 504.110 (West
2014): Not a juvenile statute.  (1) “If upon arraignment, or during any
stage of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall appoint at least
one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the
defendant’s mental condition.”
LOUISIANA—LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 832 (West 2014): “A child’s
mental incapacity to proceed, as defined by this Title, may be raised at
any time by the child, the district attorney, or the court.  When the ques-
tion of the child’s mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be
no further steps in the delinquency proceeding, except the filing of a
delinquency petition, until counsel is appointed and notified in accor-
dance with Article 809(B) and the child is found to have the mental ca-
pacity to proceed.”
• Comments 2004: (b) “The amendments to this Article emphasize
the importance of having physicians who have expertise in child
development to assess claims of incapacity.  According to recent
research, including the MacArthur Study, these factors or vari-
ables are associated with functional incompetency: age; intelli-
gence quotient; a history of severe mental illness, particularly
psychosis; mental retardation; a history of special educational
placements or diagnosis of severe learning disabilities; and living
in an extremely traumatic environment.  More broadly, ‘Deficien-
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cies in risk perception, as well as immature attitudes toward au-
thority figures, may undermine competent decision making in
ways that standard assessments of competence to stand trial do
not capture’, The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence
Study, published as Grisso et al., Juveniles’ and Adults’ Compe-
tence as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & Human Behavior 33 (2002).”
MAINE—ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3318-A (West 2014): Section
1A states, “‘Chronological immaturity’ means a condition based on a
juvenile’s chronological age and significant lack of developmental skills
when the juvenile has no significant mental illness or mental
retardation.”
• Section 6E: “If the State Forensic Service examiner determines
that the juvenile suffers from chronological immaturity, the exam-
iner shall report a comparison of the juvenile to the average juve-
nile defendant.”
• Section 8: “The burden of proof of competence is on the State if
the juvenile is less than fourteen years of age at the time the issue
of competence is raised.  If the juvenile is at least fourteen years
of age at the time the issue of competence is raised, the burden of
proof is on the juvenile.  In the event the State has the burden of
proof, it must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
juvenile is competent to proceed.  In the event the juvenile has the
burden of proof, the juvenile must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the juvenile is not competent to proceed.”
MARYLAND—MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-17.3 (West
2014): Not a definition of competency, rather a statute that defines
broader “cognitive concepts,” rather than specific functional abilities.
• (a)(3) “In determining whether the child is incompetent to pro-
ceed, the qualified expert shall consider the following factors:”
° “The child’s age, maturity level, developmental stage, and deci-
sion-making abilities”;
° “The capacity of the child to”:
 “Appreciate the allegations against the child”;
 “Appreciate the range and nature of allowable dispositions
that may be imposed in the proceedings against the child”;
 “Understand the roles of the participants and the adversary
nature of the legal process”;
 “Disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the proceedings at
issue”;
 “Display appropriate courtroom behavior”; and
 “Testify relevantly”; and
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° “Any other factors that the qualified expert deems to be
relevant.”
MASSACHUSETTS— MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 123, § 15 (West
2014): Provides for adult competency examination and commitment.
MICHIGAN—MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2020 (West 2014): Sec.
1020. (1) “A defendant to a criminal charge shall be presumed competent
to stand trial.  He shall be determined incompetent to stand trial only if
he is incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the na-
ture and object of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his de-
fense in a rational manner.  The court shall determine the capacity of a
defendant to assist in his defense by his ability to perform the tasks rea-
sonably necessary for him to perform in the preparation of his defense
and during his trial.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2060a (West 2014): (3) “‘Incompetent
to proceed’ means that a juvenile, based on age-appropriate norms, lacks
a reasonable degree of rational and factual understanding of the proceed-
ing or is unable to do 1 or more of the following”:
° “Consult with and assist his or her attorney in preparing his or
her defense in a meaningful manner.”
° “Sufficiently understand the charges against him or her.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2060a (West 2014): (1) “‘Competency
evaluation’ means a court-ordered examination of a juvenile directed to
developing information relevant to a determination of his or her compe-
tency to proceed at a particular stage of a court proceeding involving a
juvenile who is the subject of a delinquency petition.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2062 (West 2014): (1) “A juvenile 10
years of age or older is presumed competent to proceed unless the issue
of competency is raised by a party.  A juvenile less than 10 years of age
is presumed incompetent to proceed.”
MINNESOTA—MINN. STAT. JUV. DEL. R. § 20.01 (West 2014):
“SUBD. 1. INCOMPETENCY TO PROCEED DEFINED.  A child is incompetent
and shall not be permitted to enter a plea, be tried, or receive a disposi-
tion for any offense when the child lacks sufficient ability to”:
° “consult with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
with the child’s counsel”; or
° “understand the proceedings or participate in the defense due to
mental illness or mental deficiency.”
MISSISSIPPI—MISS. UNIF. CIRCUIT AND CITY CT. PRAC. R. 9.06
(West 2014): “If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or
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upon motion of an attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defen-
dant to submit to a mental examination by some competent psychiatrist
selected by the court in accordance with § 99-13-11 of the Mississippi
Code Annotated of 1972.”
• Coleman v. State, 127 So. 3d 161, 164 (Miss. 2013). Incorporates
the Dusky standard for competency: “In order to be deemed men-
tally competent to stand trial, a defendant must have ‘the suffi-
cient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding . . . and . . . a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”
MONTANA—MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-103 (2013): “A person who,
as a result of mental disease or defect or developmental disability, is
unable to understand the proceedings against the person or to assist in the
person’s own defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the
commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures.”
• In re G.T.M., 354 Mont. 197, 201–02, 222 P.3d 626, 629 (2009).
Immaturity does not determine competency: ¶ 14 “This critical
distinction between youths and adults notwithstanding, G.T.M.
complains that adults benefit from procedures to determine
whether they are mentally competent to proceed, while youths are
not protected by similar procedures to determine whether they are
mentally competent to proceed.  However, a youth alleging in-
competency based on immaturity is not similarly situated to an
adult criminal defendant alleging mental disease or defect.  All
youths experience a period of immaturity, which most youths out-
grow.  The same cannot be said for mental disease or defect.  In
fact, Montana law provides detailed procedures for determining
incompetency based on mental disease or defect that are simply
not applicable to youths claiming immaturity.”
NEBRASKA—NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-258 (West 2014): (1)
“Pending the adjudication of any case under the Nebraska Juvenile Code,
the court may order the juvenile examined by a physician, surgeon, psy-
chiatrist, duly authorized community mental health service program, or
psychologist to aid the court in determining (a) a material allegation in
the petition relating to the juvenile’s physical or mental condition, (b) the
juvenile’s competence to participate in the proceedings, (c) the juvenile’s
responsibility for his or her acts, or (d) whether or not to provide emer-
gency medical treatment.”
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NEVADA—NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.400 (West 2014): 2. “For the
purposes of this section, “incompetent” means that the person does not
have the present ability to”:
• “Understand the nature of the criminal charges against the
person”;
• “Understand the nature and purpose of the court proceedings”; or
• “Aid and assist the person’s counsel in the defense at any time
during the proceedings with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.”
NEW HAMPSHIRE—N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:20 (West 2014):
Determination of Competence. “I. As used in this section, unless the con-
text otherwise indicates, the following terms have the following
meanings”:
° “‘Chronological immaturity’ means a condition based on a ju-
venile’s chronological age and significant lack of developmen-
tal skills when the juvenile has no significant mental illness or
mental retardation.”
° “‘Mental illness’ means any diagnosable mental impairment
supported by the most current edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association.”
° “‘Developmental disability’ means a disability which is attrib-
utable to an intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, au-
tism, or a specific learning disability, or any other condition of
an individual found to be closely related to an intellectual disa-
bility as it refers to general intellectual functioning or impair-
ment in adaptive behavior or requires treatment similar to that
required for persons with an intellectual disability.”
° “‘Intellectual disability’ means significantly subaverage gen-
eral intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior.”
• “II. A minor is competent to proceed in a delinquency proceeding
if the minor has”:
° “A rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceed-
ings; and”
° “A sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding.”
NEW MEXICO—N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-17 (West 2014): (B)
“Where there are indications that the child may have a mental disorder or
developmental disability, the court, on motion by the children’s court
attorney or that of counsel for the child, may order the child to be ex-
amined at a suitable place by a physician or psychiatrist, a licensed psy-
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chologist, a licensed professional clinical counselor or a licensed
independent social worker prior to a hearing on the merits of the petition.
An examination made prior to the hearing or as a part of the predisposi-
tion study and report shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, unless the
court finds that placement in a hospital or other appropriate facility is
necessary.”
NEW YORK—N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03 (McKinney 2014): (22)
“‘Developmental disability’ means a disability of a person which”:
• (a)(1) “is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epi-
lepsy, neurological impairment, familial dysautonomia or
autism”;
• (2) “is attributable to any other condition of a person found to be
closely related to mental retardation because such condition re-
sults in similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or
adaptive behavior to that of mentally retarded persons or requires
treatment and services similar to those required for such person;
or”
• (3) “is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability de-
scribed in subparagraph (1) or (2) of this paragraph”;
• (b) “originates before such person attains age twenty-two”;
• (c) “has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely”;
and
• (d) “constitutes a substantial handicap to such person’s ability to
function normally in society.”
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 322.2 (McKinney 2014): (1) “Upon the receipt of
examination reports ordered under section 322.1, the court shall conduct
a hearing to determine whether the respondent is an incapacitated person.
The respondent, the counsel for the respondent, the presentment agency
and the commissioner of mental health or the commissioner of mental
retardation and developmental disabilities, as appropriate, shall be noti-
fied of such hearing at least five days prior to the date thereof and af-
forded an opportunity to be heard.”
NORTH CAROLINA—N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2401 (2014): Dusky
standard.
• Same standard for juveniles and adults.
SOUTH CAROLINA—S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (2013): Dusky
standard.
• No reference to “juveniles.”  Only references to family court.
TEXAS—TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.31 (West 2013): (a) “A child al-
leged by petition or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or con-
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duct indicating a need for supervision who as a result of mental illness or
mental retardation lacks capacity to understand the proceedings in juve-
nile court or to assist in the child’s own defense is unfit to proceed and
shall not be subjected to discretionary transfer to criminal court, adjudi-
cation, disposition, or modification of disposition as long as such inca-
pacity endures.”
VERMONT—VT. R. FAM. PROC. 1(I) (West 2014): (I) DETERMINATION
OF COMPETENCE TO BE SUBJECT TO DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS. “(1) In
general.  The issue of a child’s competence to be subject to delinquency
proceedings may be raised by motion of any party, or upon the court’s
own motion, at any stage of the proceedings.
• (2) “Mental Examination.  Competence shall be determined
through a mental examination conducted by a psychologist or
psychiatrist selected by the court.  In addition to the factors ordi-
narily considered in determining competence in criminal proceed-
ings, the examiner shall consider the following as appropriate to
the circumstances of the child”:
° “The age and developmental maturity of the child”;
° “whether the child suffers from mental illness or a developmen-
tal disorder, including mental retardation”;
° “whether the child has any other disability that affects the
child’s competence”; and
° “any other factor that affects the child’s competence.”
• “The child, or the state, shall have the right to obtain an indepen-
dent examination by an expert.”
VIRGINIA—VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356 (West 2014): If there is proba-
ble cause to believe that “the juvenile lacks substantial capacity to under-
stand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his own
defense, the court shall order that a competency evaluation be performed
by at least one psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, licensed professional
counselor, licensed clinical social worker, or licensed marriage and fam-
ily therapist, who is qualified by training and experience in the forensic
evaluation of juveniles.”
• (F) “If the juvenile is otherwise able to understand the charges
against him and assist in his defense, a finding of incompetency
shall not be made based solely on any or all of the following: (i)
the juvenile’s age or developmental factors, (ii) the juvenile’s
claim to be unable to remember the time period surrounding the
alleged offense, or (iii) the fact that the juvenile is under the influ-
ence of medication.”
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WEST VIRGINIA—W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-9 (West 2014): States
the procedure for finding incompetency for a juvenile is the same as for
adults.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3(c) (West 2014): Defines competency us-
ing the Dusky standard
WISCONSIN—WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.295 (West 2014): EXAMINATION
OR ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE OR PARENT. (a) “After the filing of a peti-
tion and upon a finding by the court that reasonable cause exists to war-
rant a physical, psychological, mental, or developmental examination or
an alcohol and other drug abuse assessment that conforms to the criteria
under s. 938.547(4), the court may order a juvenile within its jurisdiction
to be examined as an outpatient by personnel in an approved treatment
facility for alcohol and other drug abuse, by a physician, psychiatrist, or
licensed psychologist, or by another expert appointed by the court hold-
ing at least a master’s degree in social work or another related field of
child development, in order that the juvenile’s physical, psychological,
alcohol or other drug dependency, mental, or developmental condition
may be considered.”
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.01 (West 2014): (5)(a) “‘Developmental disabil-
ity’ means a disability attributable to brain injury, cerebral palsy, epi-
lepsy, autism, Prader-Willi syndrome, intellectual disability, or another
neurological condition closely related to an intellectual disability or re-
quiring treatment similar to that required for individuals with an intellec-
tual disability, which has continued or can be expected to continue
indefinitely and constitutes a substantial handicap to the afflicted individ-
ual.  ‘Developmental disability’ does not include dementia that is prima-
rily caused by degenerative brain disorder.”
• (b) “‘Developmental disability’, for purposes of involuntary com-
mitment, does not include cerebral palsy or epilepsy.”
WYOMING —WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303 (West 2014): Competency
for adults.
• (c) “Written reports of the examination shall be filed with the
clerk of court. The report shall include”:
° “Detailed findings”;
° “An opinion as to whether the accused has a mental illness or
deficiency, and its probable duration”;
° “An opinion as to whether the accused, as a result of mental
illness or deficiency, lacks capacity to comprehend his position,
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooper-
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ate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may
be interposed”;
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-219 (West 2014): (d) “The juvenile court shall
retain jurisdiction of the child on the petition pending final determination
of the commitment proceedings in the district court.  If proceedings in
the district court commit the child to the Wyoming state hospital, the
Wyoming life resource center or any other facility or institution for treat-
ment and care of people with a mental illness or an intellectual disability,
the petition shall be dismissed and further proceedings under this act ter-
minate.  If proceedings in the district court determine the child does not
have a mental illness or an intellectual disability to a degree rendering
him subject to involuntary commitment, the court shall proceed to a final
adjudication of the petition and disposition of the child under the provi-
sions of this act.”
